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Geoffrey Hill’s Commemorative Verse 
 
Dr. Robert Baker, Chair 
 
This paper considers the embodied ethics of Geoffrey Hill’s poetic practice. Hill stages 
his engagement with poetry through the idioms, images, tropes, and diction of the literary 
tradition.  Through this pragmatic rehearsal of the language of the dead, Hill’s poetry 
projects the tradition into the present.  Hill resists the ethical entrapments of appropriative 
poetry through his insistence upon the brute physicality of atrocity and through a rigorous 
(for both poet and reader) formal difficulty.  Hill’s practice refuses to console after the 
models of Peter Sacks, Jahan Ramazani, or John Vickery.  Instead, concerned with 
modernity’s disconnectedness, Hill’s poetry returns us to the presence of the dead, to 
their ritual and language.  Alternatively, because Hill’s subjects are historical atrocities, 
rather than natural occurrences, the sort of communal consolation that the elegy 
traditionally offered would be inappropriate to Hill’s concerns.  These atrocities are, most 
frequently, instances of human violence (the Holocaust, the Battle of Towton, the Wars 
of the Roses, etc.) and, for this reason, they do not lend themselves to the consolations of 
natural cycles of death and rebirth.  Since they were often committed in the name of 
religion, Christian transcendence is similarly questionable, as are other consolatory 
transcendences.  These conventional modes of consolation being denied, Hill’s poetry 
reconnects us with the dead through the formal devices and techniques of the historical 
institution of poetry.  Through the rigorous engagement with and sacrificial making of 
poetry, Hill attempts to redeem tradition and history for the present.     
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To my father, who undoubtedly remembers his Latin: 
Ego sum discipulus mei patris.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Geoffrey Hill’s poetry takes literary tradition and history as both its subject and 
its medium.  Hill insists upon the ethical importance of “knowing the dead,” articulated in 
The Triumph of Love (1998).  His notion of “understanding” as “diligence / and attention, 
appropriately understood / as actuated self-knowledge, a daily acknowledgement / of 
what is owed the dead” asserts that an understanding of the self is inextricable from an 
understanding of one’s historical indebtedness.  In his essay “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and 
‘Atonement’” (1978), Hill presents a similar argument in terms of aesthetics.  There he 
argues, quoting Yeats, that “when the poem ‘comes right with a click like a closing box’, 
what is there effected is the atonement of aesthetics with rectitude of judgement.”
1
  Both 
Hill’s poetic and critical formulations share an emphasis on the arduousness and ethical 
import of the poet’s task.  The poet’s “diligence / and attention,” his “rectitude of 
judgement,” operate upon and within the art of poetry.  For Hill, these subjects, upon 
which the poet must exercise his judgement, are most frequently historical atrocities and 
the literary forms which have inscribed and transmuted them.  Thus in the sonnet series 
“Funeral Music,” for the King Log collection (1968), Hill considers the 100 Years War, 
the War of the Roses, and the Battle of Towton, specifically.  Similarly, “September 
Song” considers the more contemporary atrocity of the Holocaust through a form 
reminiscent of the poetics of Paul Celan.  In its more recent manifestation, this insistence 
upon the interconnectedness between history and literary tradition has taken the form of 
translation, as with Eugenio Montale’s “The Storm” from Without Title (2006), and 
extensive quotation, as with “Citations I,” “Citations II,” and the “On Reading…” poems 
from A Treatise of Civil Power (2007).  The prevalence of this emphasis on history and 
                                                 
1
 Geoffrey Hill, Lords of Limit: Essays on Literature and Ideas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
10. 
 
2 
the manner in which is has been inscribed by literary tradition is the foundation of Hill’s 
critical and poetic practice.  The “diligence / and attention” of the poet will focus as much 
upon the history of language as upon the history which that language inscribes. 
In the recent collection, A Treatise of Civil Power (2007), Geoffrey Hill asserts 
that he 
think[s] of poetry as it was said 
Of Alanbrooke’s war diary: a work done 
to gain, or regain, possession of himself, 
as a means of survival, and, in that sense, 
a mode of moral life.
2
 
Our discussion will attempt to explicate exactly what Hill means by this gnomic assertion, 
what this might look like in practice, and what the implications of this assertion are.  
Although critics such as Peter Sacks, Jahan Ramazani, and W. David Shaw consider 
Hill’s poetry primarily elegiac, it is my contention that Hill’s poems are not elegiac as 
that term is commonly understood.  They do not offer consolation, nor do they attempt to 
establish an alternative to the dead’s absence.  Rather Hill’s poetry reconnects a 
modernity fatally disconnected from its own indebtedness to its history by engaging that 
history in a poetic practice that is traditional and inventive, difficult and determinate, 
disturbing and redemptive.  
Critical considerations of the elegy have traditionally focused on the 
psychological work of consolation these poems seek to perform.  Sacks and Ramazani 
ground their studies in the psychological model of “successful mourning” developed in 
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Freud’s essay “Mourning and Melancholia.”
3
  In Sacks’s reading, the elegy—at least the 
English elegy through Yeats—enacts a psychological narrative of loss and substitution.  
The classic example, for Sacks, is Milton’s “Lycidas.”  Milton’s elegy begins with an 
expression of shock in response to the loss of Lycidas: 
Yet once more, O ye Laurels, and once more 
Ye Myrtels brown, with Ivy never-sear, 
I com to pluck your Berries harsh and crude, 
And with forc’d fingers rude, 
Shatter your leaves before the mellowing year. 
Bitter constraint, and sad occasion dear, 
Compels me to disturb your season due: 
For Lycidas is dead, dead ere his prime.
4
 
Lycidas, the object of desire in Sacks’s model, is recognized as absent.  The libidinous 
attachment having been severed by death, the speaker must seek a substitute object of 
desire.  Initially this rift manifests itself as a relinquishment of the world.  The speaker 
cannot accept the loss of Lycidas and abdicates agency in the world: 
Alas! what boots it with uncessant care 
To tend the homely slighted Shepherds trade, 
And strictly meditate the thankless Muse, 
Were it not better don as others use, 
To sport with Amaryllis in the shade, 
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to Yeats (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 
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4 
Or tangles of Neæra’s hair?
5
 
Faced with the loss of the object of desire, the libido reattaches itself to the ego 
and causes regression to a state of secondary narcissism.  The speaker becomes the self-
reflexive object of desire.  Because the self has become the new object of desire, familial 
and communal obligations are disregarded.  The self becomes the subject’s sole concern.  
In this state, the speaker seeks explanations for his loss before finally arriving at a 
substitute object in Lycidas’s spiritual transcendence: 
Weep no more, woful Shepherds weep no more, 
For Lycidas your sorrow is not dead,  
Sunk though he be beneath the watry floor 
So sinks the day-star in the Ocean bed, 
And yet anon repairs his dropping head, 
And tricks his beams, and with new spangled Ore, 
Flames in the forehead of the sky: 
So Lycidas sunk low, but mounted high, 
Through the dear might of him that walked the waves.
6
 
This is the poetic expression of “successful mourning” for Sacks:  the libido has 
reattached itself to the transfigured, poeticized Lycidas as the object of desire.  This is, in 
brief, the principal, common structure that Sacks finds in the development of the English 
elegy from Spenser to Yeats. 
In his consideration of the English elegy after Yeats, Ramazani continues to 
deploy the Freudian model.  In this context, he finds that what distinguishes the elegy in 
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the modern and post-modern periods is a rejection of traditional forms of consolation and 
a refusal to accept alternative objects of desire.  This is the persistent melancholy found 
in Thomas Hardy’s “The Going.”  Like “Lycidas,” Hardy’s poem begins with an 
expression of shock at the loss of the object of desire and of the difficulty of separation: 
Why did you give no hint that night 
That quickly after the morrow’s dawn, 
And calmly, as if indifferent quite, 
You would close your term here, up and be gone 
 Where I could not follow 
 With wing of swallow 
To gain one glimpse of you ever anon! 
Already we can hear the tonal difference between Hardy’s elegy and Milton’s.  What 
begins, here, as a question (“why did you give no hint”) ends in accusation.  The speaker 
sounds indignant as well as bereft.  He accuses the loved one of dying with calm 
indifference, and the poem’s reiterated “why” feels more like an interrogation than an 
elegy.  Further, the speaker only glances at the potential consolation of spiritual 
transcendence—“you would close you term here, up and be gone”—and quickly returns 
to the experience of loss.  Instead of enacting a process of grief and consolation as 
“Lycidas” does, Hardy’s poem remains mired in grief’s more insidious modes of 
accusation and regret.  This disposition is consistent with that regression to a secondary 
narcissism in which the libido has attached itself to the ego when faced with the absence 
of the object of desire.  This condition leads, in “Lycidas,” to a desire on the part of the 
speaker to an abdication of personal agency.  In the “successful mourning” of Milton’s 
 
6 
poem, this state is eventually surmounted; in “The Going,” however, the speaker never 
moves beyond his morbid attachment to the dead: 
 Well, well! All’s past amend, 
 Unchangeable.  It must go. 
I seem but a dead man held on end 
To sink down soon… O you could not know 
 That such swift fleeing 
 No soul foreseeing— 
Not even I—would undo me so!
7
 
While the speaker does exculpate the dead—“O you could not know”—the libido finds 
no substitute object.  Instead, the speaker accepts his mortality in the mode of rejection.  
He remains in a state of secondary narcissism that Freud termed “melancholia” or 
unhealthy mourning.  Ramazani sees this refusal to accept consolation as the primary 
mode of the modern and post-modern elegy. 
Ramazani argues that the weakening of traditional belief systems results in the 
insufficiency of past traditions and cultural rituals to provide consolation.  Put simply, the 
Christian transcendence in which the speaker of “Lycidas” finds consolation is not 
available to Hardy’s speaker because the Christian framework, whence such consolation 
derives its efficacy, is no longer culturally vital.  The ritual practices of the elegy (or any 
other cultural practice) are grounded in and express culturally shared frameworks.  Once 
those frameworks are debased or debunked, the rituals that embody them can no longer 
perform their culturally determined function.  The failure of the elegy to provide 
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consolation, in Ramazani’s thesis, points to a cultural lack.  Because this lack resides in 
the cultural order of institutions, the primary predicament of the contemporary elegy, and 
Hill’s poetry particularly, is cultural and anthropological as much as it is psychological.   
Recently Robert Pogue Harrison has argued that the primary predicament of post-
modernity is its having become unmoored from its historical roots: 
one could say that in the age of the new barbarism words lose their moral 
memory.  For even our moral memory—indeed our morality above all—
depends upon the historical resonance of its foundational words: liberty, 
duty, sacrifice, compassion, equality.  The ‘false eloquence’ of the times 
exploits the traditional charisma of such words while at the same time 
emptying them of their historical memory.
8
 
Harrison’s insistence upon words’ “moral memory” echoes Hill’s insistence on an 
“intrinsic value”
9
 in language which the poet must resurrect through attention and 
reflection.  As we shall see, Hill’s criticism and poetry evidence a struggle to consider 
and recover the “moral memory” of language.  Thus by examining the principles of 
judgement that Hill applies in his criticism, we can discover the principles of enactment 
that inform his poetic practice.  Similarly, Harrison’s awareness that “false eloquence” 
leverages words’ “traditional charisma while at the same time emptying them of their 
historical memory” recalls Hill’s description of an irresponsibly elegiac poetry in 
“History as Poetry”: “taste / Of Pentecost’s ashen feast.”  In that poem, Hill considers 
that vacuity of a poetry that appropriates history for its own gains rather than struggling 
with its own historical indebtedness.  Because of this failure of self-examination, the 
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words lack Pentecostal vitality and remain inanimate ash.  In opposition to modernity’s 
disconnectedness from its own history, both Harrison and Hill point to the importance of 
the present being grounded in the past in a vital way. 
Harrison vividly describes the traditional poetic response to such erasures of 
history: 
when history turns against its own memorializing and self-conserving 
drive, when it is perceived to have become a force of erasure rather than of 
inscription, of assault upon the earth rather than humanization of the earth, 
then images of an apocalyptic sea inevitably surge up in the human 
imagination.  Such images remind us that history exists in a covenant that 
has a history of its own, and a finite one at that, and remind us furthermore 
that only an ever-vigilant awareness of the covenant’s finitude assures its 
perpetuity.
10
 
Although Harrison does not cite Hill in his extensive examination of poetry, such images 
of the dead taken up and returned by an apocalyptic sea abound, particularly in Hill’s 
early collections.  In “Genesis,” the dead lie “under the rough pelt of the sea; // Though 
Earth has rolled beneath her weight / The bones that cannot bear the light.”  A “possessed 
sea” litters “ruinous arms” in “Requiem for the Plantagenet Kings,” and the dead lie 
“secure” until, with “the scouring fires of trial-day,” “the sea / Across daubed rock 
evacuates its dead.”  “Metamorphoses, 4: Drake’s Drum” maintains the dead’s 
permanence and alterity in the face of the present’s “designed wreaths… used words.”  In 
“The Guardians,” the old “gather the dead as the first dead scrape home” from a 
malevolent sea.  Through such images, Hill’s poetry evidences its participation in the 
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tradition of concern that Harrison analyzes.  Hill’s particular contribution to this tradition 
is sacrificial struggle to recover the history and tradition from the “apocalyptic sea” of 
cultural amnesia. 
In the process of this recovery, Hill’s poetry engages the history and tradition in 
what Harrison refers to as the “humic element”
11
 of language. Images of the sea’s erasure 
have figured prominently in English poetry since “Lycidas,” as Harrison notes, and have 
their ultimate ground in the biblical literature which Milton’s poem recalls.  Hill’s 
“authentic retrieval”
12
 of this image, time and again, grounds his poetry in the priority of 
tradition. Hill’s consideration of tradition and his scrupulous
13
 practice remind us that, 
has Harrison phrases it, “as human beings we are born of the dead—of the regional 
ground they occupy, of the languages they inhabited, of the worlds they brought into 
being, of the many institutional, legal, cultural, and psychological legacies that, through 
us, connect them to the unborn.”
14
  Hill’s poetry serves as an acknowledgement of “what 
is owed the dead” because of its enactment of this vital relation between past and present.  
It is because of this indebtedness—assuming, of course, that one is aware of the 
obligation—that the present “is the sustaining basis of those who are ‘not,’ of those 
whose mode of being is defined by ‘not’ insofar as they have perished.  If to be 
responsible in the mode of guilt means to ‘be-the-basis for,’ Dasein is responsible for 
whatever is of the order of human dying, and not simply its own ‘constant’ dying.”
15
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 Ibid., x. 
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modern indeterminacy. 
14
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Hill’s “peculiar unnecessary shame,” which the poet bears into a “world growing ever 
more shameless,”
16
 is analogous to Harrison’s understanding of Dasein’s “primordial 
guilt.”
17
  Hill characterizes this indebtedness as shame because that legacy includes those 
historical atrocities that Hill takes as the subject of his poetry.  The world into which the 
poet bears that shame is “growing ever more shameless” because, in its disconnectedness, 
it fails to acknowledge the shame of its primordial guilt.  In Harrison’s terms, modernity 
can no longer hear “the call of conscience,” which 
reaches us from the nullity of our being’s ground, in fact comes from—or 
comes in the guise of—the dead?  Is it not they—the dead—who, in their 
uncanny modes, indwell in the temporal ecstasies and come out to meet us 
in our self-overreaching? Are we not constitutionally guilty in their regard, 
indebted to their sacrifice and labor, subject to their authority insofar as 
they, not we, authored the institutions that ensure our future?
18
 
Hill’s poetry fulfills this obligation to the dead by drawing attention to the 
indebtedness of poetry itself.  In so doing, Hill’s poems recall the attention of the present 
from its own “‘constant’ dying” to its own indebtedness, particularly to the historical 
atrocities in its own legacy.  The poem becomes “a mode of moral life” by bringing into a 
concurrence the self that is “‘constantly’ dying” and the not-self that “whatever is of the 
order of human dying.”  The ethicality
19
 of this act resides in Hill’s recognition of the 
responsibility to the past and the future that Harrison characterizes as an essential aspect 
of the human condition.  In their scrupulosity with language, the considerations of the 
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history and tradition, which are Hill’s poems, enact how the living respond to, are 
responsible towards, and perpetuate the dead.  In Harrison’s terms, the residual texts of 
tradition are “more than enduring tablets where an author’s words survive his or her 
demise.  They are the gifts of human worlds, cosmic in nature, that hold their place in 
time so that the living and the unborn may inhabit them at will, make themselves at home 
in their articulate humanity.”
20
 Or, in Hill’s terms, 
…. Still 
I think of poetry as it was said 
of Alanbrooke’s war diary: a work done 
to gain, or regain, possession of himself, 
as a means of survival, and, in that sense, 
a mode of moral life.
21
  
The “mode of moral life,” here, is both an inscription and an enactment (“diary” and 
“work”), which is a way of gaining possession of the self by regaining the ways others 
have gained possession of themselves.  Hill’s structure here emphasizes the 
interconnectedness of utterance and act, the “doing-by-saying” that W. David Shaw 
depicts as central to the historical development of the elegy.
22
  Hill’s choice to place the 
totalizing utterance—“a work done”—at the line-ending (importantly not at the stanza’s 
end) forecloses the semantic efficacy of Alanbrooke’s war diary, asserting its historical 
pastness, even as the self-perpetuating movement of the stanza continues the reinscription 
promised by “I think of poetry as ….”  The impulse towards simile generates that ligature 
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between the living and the dead that makes the absent present.  In such ways, Hill’s 
poetry enacts a struggle with its historical inheritance.  Through such struggles the poems 
not only express an ethics of embodied practice, they enact that ethical position in the 
workings of language.  
That in “Citations I” such a positivist assertion can develop from a poem that 
begins be depicting the existential uncertainty of post-modernity establishes the 
tradition—and, particularly, their inscriptions—as a “ground-base” for a stable self-
conception: 
This not quite knowing what the earth requires: 
earthiness, earthliness, or things ethereal; 
whether spiritus mundi notices bad faith 
or if it cares; defraudings at the source, 
the bare usury of the species.  In the end 
one is as broken as the vows and tatters, 
petitions with blood on them, the charred prayers 
spiralling godwards on intense thermals.  
Hill here recapitulates the characteristic questioning of responsibility towards the “humic 
element.”  For Hill, the earth—which Harrison characterizes as the “humane element” in 
juxtaposition to the sea’s inhumane erasure—remains at best an ambivalent medium 
(“whether spiritus mundi notices bad faith / or if it cares”) and at worst a malevolently 
equivocating one: “…. A field / After battle utters its own sound / Which is like nothing 
on earth, but is earth.”
23
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In contrast to the Christian context of the fifteenth century, which allowed those at 
the Battle of Towton to bespeak “doomsday and they meant it by / God,” Hill’s temporal 
position limits the semantic certainty available to any utterance; one is left with “this not 
quite knowing what the earth requires.”  The historical context of the Wars of the Roses, 
of which the Battle of Towton was a part, provided an ethical context lacking in Hill’s 
context.  Rather than a provided ethical system, Hill’s poetry points to the need to work at 
developing and enacting an ethical practice in the context of modernity.  The implicit 
need, in “Citations I,” for a poetry that achieves possession of the self and that is “a mode 
of moral life” derives from the threat of dissolution figured in the conclusion of “Funeral 
Music 3”: “blindly we lay down, blindly / Among the carnage the most delicate souls / 
Tup in their marriage blood, gasping ‘Jesus’.” The faith which allowed the fifteenth-
century aggressors of the Battle of Towton to speak and mean it by God, and allowed the 
victims to gasp “Jesus,” is denied to “one… as broken as the vows and tatters, / petitions 
with blood on them, the charred prayers / spiralling godwards on intense thermals.”  
While the earth—a figure of human history for both Hill and Harrison—absorbs the 
tradition, it also disperses and buries its influence.  While the earth may be the “humane 
element” for archiving the resources of tradition, Hill’s poetry reminds us that accessing 
those resources is a sacrificial struggle.    
For a historical consciousness such as Hill’s, the questions of faith necessarily 
remain conjoined with the historical working out of that faith.  Hill draws on a quote 
from Rush Rhees to establish the humane within the historicity of language: “For we 
speak as others have spoken before us.  And a sense of language is also a feeling for ways 
 
14 
of living that have meant something.”
24
  From the historical record, Hill’s criticism 
attempts to recover and explicate what those “ways of living” were.  His poetry enacts 
that process of recovery and consideration.  It is with such an understanding of the way 
language can perpetuate tradition that Hill claims that Charles Sorely’s letter home is “an 
exemplary instance of the at-one-ment of the ‘sense of language’ with a feeling for the 
ways of life.”  Hill finds an awareness of language’s indebtedness embodied in the 
texture of the letter.  However, in the fraught nexus created between “Funeral Music 3” 
and “Citations I,” the quote from Rhees also points to its obverse: that a “sense of 
language” may make one aware of the insufficiency, or immorality, of that language to 
express felt ways of life.  Shaw points to the difficulties that turn “this not quite 
knowing” into a linguistic as well as ethical struggle: “For the poet Geoffrey Hill, who 
finds it barbarous that elegiac language should exult in itself, even when memorializing a 
death camp, the pastoral elegy’s power to heal and console may be deeply insulting.”
25
  
While the recovery and explication that the criticism engages in is fraught with the 
complications of judgments passed, the poetry acknowledges an even more fraught 
process of judgment when the poet comes to express his own “feeling for ways of life.”   
Shaw’s remarks on Hill’s difficulties with language point towards the subtle 
distinction embodied in Hill’s deployment of Rhees’s quote and Alanbrooke’s war diaries: 
without a sense of one’s own indebtedness, the pastoral elegy (to take Shaw’s example) 
may no longer be a viable mode of expression, may commit its own atrocities.  When we 
write (or live, for that matter) without a sense of our own primordial guilt, we risk 
appropriating history for the present.  The elegy that consoles the culpable insults the 
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dead to whom they are indebted.  However, with a sense of one’s “peculiar unnecessary 
shame,” the past may provide positive models for original and responsible expression.  
Often the reinvention of form and utterance constitutes appropriate memorializing: 
…. I’d  
swear myself blind atrophy’s not the word 
but that invention reinvents itself 
every so often in the line of death.
26
  
Even as the traditional modes of supplication (vows, petitions, prayers) may no longer be 
viable for Hill either because of historical atrocity (“petitions with blood on them” recalls 
the militant Christianity depicted in “Funeral Music,” while “charred prayers” evokes the 
Holocaust) or because of modern disconnectedness, their historical value may be 
maintained even as they are reinvented.  The process of invention, for Hill, is always a 
process of reinvention from the inheritance of tradition and history.  Through an 
awareness of how others have spoken before us, we can speak more responsibly to our 
present and future.  This is particularly the case when Hill comes to memorialize 
historical atrocities of the modern era.  Through a consideration of and judgment upon 
traditional ways of speaking, Hill finds ways of responding to his own historical position.  
Thus in considering the ways in which poetry constitutes “a mode of moral life,” 
we must first examine the nature of Hill’s engagement with tradition.  Harrison describes 
this quality as “lexification,” a “retentive relating or binding by which the human mind, 
like our basic words, continuously accesses the priority into and out of which it is 
born.”
27
  Hill stages his engagement with poetry through the idioms, images, tropes, and 
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diction of the literary tradition.  Through this pragmatic rehearsal of the language of 
tradition, Hill’s poetry projects the dead into futurity.  Yet as Harrison responsibly notes, 
an engagement with the dead can easily become an appropriation of the dead for the 
poet’s consolation and acclaim.  Hill resists such ethical entrapments through his 
insistence upon the brute physicality of atrocity and through a rigorous (for both poet and 
reader) formal difficulty.   
Finally we must consider a central tension between Harrison’s claims and Hill’s 
practice.  Harrison claims that mourning is central to our “being-towards-the-dead”; yet 
Hill’s practice refuses to console after the models of Sacks, Ramazani, or Vickery.  On 
the one hand we should note that Harrison does not emphasize consolation, but rather the 
institution of mourning and burial as a cultural practice.  It is the social act of objectifying 
loss that makes the burial ritual central to Harrison’s theory.  For this reason, we need not 
expect a poetry of “authentic retrieval” to console.  Instead, poetry, like Hill’s, concerned 
with modernity’s disconnectedness returns us to the presence of the dead, to their ritual 
and language.  Alternatively, because Hill’s subjects are historical atrocities, rather than 
natural occurrences, the sort of communal consolation that the elegy traditionally offered 
would be inappropriate to Hill’s concerns.  These atrocities are, most frequently, 
instances of human violence (the Holocaust, Towton, the Wars of the Roses, Shiloh 
Church) and, for this reason, they do not lend themselves to the consolations of natural 
cycles of death and rebirth.  Since they were often committed in the name of religion 
(“they bespoke doomsday and they meant it by / God”), Christian transcendence is 
similarly questionable, as are other consolatory transcendences.  These conventional 
modes of consolation being denied, Hill’s poetry reconnects us with the dead through the 
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formal devices and techniques of the historical institution of poetry.  Through the 
rigorous engagement with tradition and the sacrificial making of poetry, Hill attempts to 
redeem tradition and history for the present.     
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CHAPTER I: “THE DEAD MAINTAIN THEIR GROUND” 
Rather than recognizing Hill as primarily an historical and commemorative poet, 
early considerations of his work frequently noted the mythopoetic elements in Hill’s 
poetry, particularly in the early collections.  This led many to promote Hill as the heir of 
William Blake and the larger Romantic project of imaginative reinvention.  In Harold 
Bloom’s comparison, “Blake could insist that pity survived only because we make each 
other piteous, but Hill comes later, and for him the intoxication of belatedness is to know 
that our reality and our desires are both negated by our appearance as legatees.”
28
  Yet the 
very notion of “legatees,” of prior obligation to history or tradition or language, 
undermines the self-inspired stance of the Romantic poet-prophet.  The difficulty, as 
Jeffrey Hooker explains, is Hill’s awareness of his indebtedness to a tradition which both 
enables and constrains the poet: “Man cannot know the Creation without his language, 
myths, fables, systems, artifacts; nor can he create purely, without mixed motives or the 
imposition of a pattern on experience.”
29
  In “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and ‘Atonement’,” Hill 
addresses the dilemma of Romanticism, at once acknowledging its appeal and negotiating 
away from its more egotistical implications: 
the major Romanticism of our time, or that which some propound as the 
major Romanticism, sees the poet’s vocation as a ‘searching for a way of 
reconciling human vision with the energies, powers, presences, of the non-
human cosmos’.  Charles Olson has described the poem as a ‘high energy-
construct and, at all points, an energy-discharge’.  In such cases the 
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‘menace’ of poetry may be taken as referring not only to the ‘energy’ 
which is to be released, at whatever cost, but also to the inevitable 
fatalities occurring in any high-risk occupation.  In my thesis, however, 
the idea of ‘menace’ is entirely devoid of sublimity: it is meanly 
experiential rather than grandly mythical.
30
 
The groundedness that Hill claims as poetry’s “menace” stands at odds with 
sublime claims like Bloom’s (“the intoxication of belatedness”).  Rather than pointing to 
something beyond itself, Hill understands poetry as enmeshed in the common experience 
of language and history.   Hill’s parenthetical aside, “at whatever cost,” pushes 
“inevitable losses” closer to the inhumane “collateral damage” with its dark 
understanding of acceptable losses.  Similarly, “high-risk occupation” has a reserved 
sneer coming so close upon “the idea of ‘menace’ is entirely devoid of sublimity… is 
meanly experiential.”  While Hill here does not diminish the importance of the poetic 
utterance, he does foreclose the value of its more hyperbolic manifestations.  Instead, he 
proceeds to assert that the “menace” of poetry “comes close to resembling that ‘frightful 
discovery of mortality’ to which [T.S.] Eliot alludes.”
31
  The meanly experiential aspect 
of poetry’s “menace” is, in part, that temptation to escape from the facts of history and 
from language’s complicity in historical atrocity.  The “atonement” is, alternatively, a 
reconciliation between such historical facts of language and the poet’s responsible 
engagement with and through them. Because of this historical recalcitrance in the 
medium, the writing of poetry shares more with Eliot’s “hard labour” and with Milton’s 
sense of writing with “Christian diligence or judgement” than it does with a post-
                                                 
30
 Hill, Lords of Limit, 15. 
31
 Ibid. 
 
20 
Romantic “spontaneous outpouring of powerful feelings” divorced from Wordsworth’s 
ethical and social obligations.   
Hill’s technique exemplifies the fraught condition of the poet whose métier is the 
language in which the persistent vitality of history is inscribed.  In this sense, Hill’s 
predicament seems close to Bloom’s poetic agon; however, this would be a 
misapprehension.  Hill’s relationship with history and the poetic tradition involves not 
only an obligation, which might act as a restraint, but also a generous inheritance that 
becomes a poetic resource.  Hill’s technique guards against the solipsism of Bloom’s 
achieved apophrades, in which “the new poem’s achievement makes it seem to us… as 
though the later poet himself had written the precursor’s characteristic work.”
32
 To 
subsume tradition into the self would ignore “what is owed the dead.”  While that 
obligation can often act as a constraint, the priority of tradition must be maintained as 
separate from the self.  Hill rejects a Romantic remaking of tradition in his own image 
and rather asks that tradition and history become the foundation whence derive his own 
ethical judgments.   
In “Merlin,” from Hill’s first collection For the Unfallen (1959), this emphasis on 
the priority of tradition takes the form of a consideration of the dead and the poet’s 
predicament: 
I will consider the outnumbering dead: 
For they are the husks of what was rich seed. 
Now, should they come together to be fed, 
They would outstrip the locusts’ covering tide. 
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Arthur, Elaine, Mordred; they are all gone 
Among the raftered galleries of bone. 
By the long barrows of Logres they are made one, 
And over their city stands the pinnacled corn.
33
  
The distinction—one of subtle tonal variance—between Hill’s relationship with tradition 
and Bloom’s “anxiety of influence” obtains in that initial expression of intentionality: 
“will consider.”  The future tense gives the poem a sense of inquiry and exploration that 
also marks Hill’s essays at their best.  The impulse and the methodology are those of 
meditation and judgment rather than recreation and argumentation.  As Henry Hart 
describes it, 
Hill’s obsession with the dead is really his obsession with tradition and 
history, whose organic and seasonal cycles he ritualistically observes in 
nearly every poem.  Meditations, often disguised as mythic quests, follow 
the natural rhythms of withdrawal and return, rising into intense 
perception and passionate articulation, then falling back into the silent 
recalcitrant earth.  When moral perception fails, and when the vanity of 
the artist’s attempt to act as conscience and unacknowledged legislator of 
his race predominates, Hill rises to challenge these defeats by writing of 
them winningly.
34
 
Hart rightly adduces a conjunction of meditation and mythic quest: for Hill the poet’s 
search for “rectitude of judgement” participates in aspects of both the religious meditative 
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tradition and the tradition of the romance epic. However, his characterization of Hill as a 
more disgruntled Shelley again represents the critical attempt to locate Hill as a post-
Romantic writer.  If anything, for Hill, the poem, not the poet, is the “unacknowledged 
legislator of his race” and even this seems an altogether too expansive gesture.  What 
Hart misses is the private connotations of “meditation” that coincide with Hill’s “I will 
consider” as both diligent meditation and attentive deference.  Directly proceeding Hill’s 
stated disposition, Hill offers justification, “For they are the husks of what was rich seed”; 
the preceding colon doubly reinforces this clause’s role as explanation and justification.  
Already we have, within Hill’s texture of words, the lineaments of a meditation. 
The weight of the threat—or at least potential threat—in “the outnumbering dead” 
is not entirely contained by the temporal distance of Hill’s “was” in the second line.  
Hill’s allusion evokes a literary tradition of considering the dead that runs from Homer 
and Virgil through to T.S. Eliot’s allusion to Dante in “The Waste Land”: “So many / I 
had not thought death had undone so many.”
35
 Hill’s allusion complicates the mere act of 
considering the dead by acknowledging the literary history of such considerations.  Hill’s 
awareness of this indebtedness revitalizes the conventional literary figure, “the 
outnumbering dead,” into something more than mere “husks.”  The “outnumbering dead” 
contains the weight of the past and the poet’s experience of that weight within language 
through an acknowledgement of “what is owed the dead.”  This sort of “understanding” 
accounts for the odd interaction of agencies in the image that follows.  Certainly the 
threat which the dead pose remains in the moment of the poem; however, the passive 
infinite, “to be fed,” maintains the causal agency of the poet—first announced in “I will 
consider”—in equipoise with the dead’s agency to “outnumber.”  The threat that the dead 
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“would outstrip the locusts’ covering tide” remains guardedly in the conditional, even as 
the poet allows the suggestion of other mythic catastrophes (the biblical plague of locusts 
and the Flood) to hang on the lineaments of the utterance’s apprehension.  The polyphony 
of echo here acknowledges the threat of the “outnumbering dead” by keeping them 
constrained; yet, like the revitalization of the traditional figure, these echoes ground the 
poem’s metaphor. The acknowledgement of prior voices enacts the appropriateness of 
associating the dead with so animated an image as a swarm of locusts.  The complex 
dynamic between utterance and echo acknowledges tradition while resisting the overt 
imposition of its presence that would make the poem a servile imitation.  
Hill takes up the issues of imitation and originality in his essay “The Tartar’s Bow 
and the Bow of Ulysses” (1991), where he acknowledges the difficulty between 
communication as a social contract and communication as obsequiousness: “the 
distinction between advocating technical compliance and maintaining the civil ‘Arts of 
Complacency and good behaviour’ is not always easily drawn.”
36
  To Hill’s 
understanding, working from a prior formulation by Thomas Hobbes, “poetic measure… 
is a manifestation of ‘Custom’ which ‘hath so great a power that the Minde suggesteth 
onely the first word; the rest follow habitually’ while, at the same time, it is the power to 
override, with its ever-renewing capacity for springing and counterpointing, the habitual 
and the customary.”
37
  While Hill’s “springing and counterpointing” recalls the dynamic 
between spoken and poetic cadence in Hopkins’s “sprung rhythm,” what is sprung and 
counterpointed in “Merlin” is the indebtedness of poetic imagery to tradition.  The 
appropriateness of Hill’s locust metaphor—and his revitalization of the figure of the 
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“outnumbering dead,” for that matter—is a function of its acknowledgement of and 
resistance to that “Custom,” which is the inheritance of tradition.  In that regard, the 
process of the metaphor’s judgement mirrors that of Hill’s critical judgement.  The 
quotation from Hobbes, “Custom hath so great a power that the Minde suggesteth onely 
the first word; the rest follow habitually,” is itself sprung and counterpointed by Hill’s 
own critical judgement.  In so doing, the critical judgement acknowledges at once, 
through its recourse to quotation, the obligations inherent in the deployment of a 
particular meter and, simultaneously, the potentialities that gift of history enables.  In 
both cases, the appropriateness of Hill’s judgement stems from his work within history 
and language.  His poems and critical essays ground themselves in and grow out of an 
understanding of his own indebtedness. 
Thus “Merlin” moves from the complex dynamic of rehearsal and creation, 
utterance and echo, into the further consideration of the moment of the poem and the 
influence of tradition upon that moment.  “Arthur, Elaine, Mordred”: as Hill’s lines toll 
out these names from among the “outnumbering dead” they gain totemic strength, 
reiterating the energy of words so deftly handled in the first stanza.  The plaintive “they 
are all gone” acknowledges the ephemeral presence of the dead in language by 
acknowledging the poem’s indebtedness to the ubi sunt motif.  The historical awareness 
embodied in the “outnumbering dead” returns here, recalling our attention to the presence 
of the dead in quotidian language.  Hill resuscitates the fatalism of “they are all gone”—
and the ubi sunt motif generally—by reinvesting it with an awareness of its own literary 
history and by drawing the motif into the present.  Just as the first stanza acknowledges 
the threat of the dead by transforming their prior utterance into a vital structure of 
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language, as this stanza begins the dead are recalled, paradoxically, through a 
conventional evocation of their absence.  This is to reassert the dead’s presence in our 
emotions and the structures of language through which those emotions find expression.  
The line break, “gone / Among,” subtly represents this paradox in its own structure of 
language, allowing both the sense of “gone from among…,” implying the true absence of 
the dead from language as well as from the world, and the sense of “gone out among…,” 
suggesting the presence of the dead not in names but in the “raftered galleries of bone” 
that are the structures of living language.  The semantic ambiguity acknowledges the 
threat to the dead inherent in their priority: their inheritors may reject or ignore their 
inheritance.   
In the second stanza, the threat is that the poem does not respond to the 
underlying echoes of the ubi sunt’s question.  In that case, the dead are truly gone from 
“Among the raftered galleries of bone.”  Thus, the concluding image must consider 
another threat: 
By the long barrows of Logres they are made one, 
And over their city stands the pinnacled corn. 
Here the threat of absence and anonymity foreshadowed in the juxtaposition 
between the tolled names and “they are all gone” finds its apocalyptic fulfillment in “they 
are made one,” an absence that the near-rhyme (“gone / bone”) reinforces.  The image 
considers the threat of cultural amnesia under the image of physical erasure: the dead are 
absent from the present because they have been erased from memory.  Hill, however, 
redeems this erasure by forgetting neither the dead nor his own images.  In the 
specifically “pinnacled corn,” Hill’s translation of the city of the dead into the “pinnacled 
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corn” is the objective correlative of his technique.  Further, the alliterative and assonantal 
echoes of “long” and “barrows” within “Logres” acknowledge the presence of the dead 
within the echo chamber of language.  Yet this alone would be too facile and self-
congratulating a conclusion: a triumphalism that considers that which is acknowledged to 
have been accomplished.  Instead, in “they are made one,” Hill literalizes the poem’s 
achieved atonement.  The image of the “pinnacled corn,” as a transformation of city of 
the dead, both acknowledges the threat of cultural amnesia and encapsulates the poem’s 
generation from the presence of tradition. This recapitulates the technique of engagement 
enacted in the image of the locusts and the poem’s manner of resisting the threat of 
tradition overwhelming the moment of utterance. The final image atones aesthetics with 
rectitude of judgement by at once restraining and remembering tradition in the texture of 
its utterance.   
Further, Hill’s poetic meter,
38
 evocative of the heroic couplet, responsibly 
restrains itself in the expression of that consideration as mediation and attention. Hill’s 
meter humbly acknowledges the difference between considering and conjuring.  The title, 
“Merlin,” casts the poet in the role of magician or conjuror, and the poem, through its 
poetic figures and images, responsibly acknowledges the complexities involved in a vital 
engagement with the dead, an understanding reinforced by the atonement effected in the 
poem’s final image.  The poem realizes the “ever-renewing capacity for springing and 
counterpointing” by recalling the prior meter without reiterating it.  The deviation to 
near-rhymed couplets eschews the Romantic image of the poet as the Miltonic Satan, 
heroically making worlds unto himself.  Instead, Hill’s suggestion of the meter does the 
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work of conjuring the priority of tradition promised by the poem’s title.  Our awareness 
of his indebtedness remains “meanly experiential” and allusive, rather than sublime.  The 
near-rhyme couplets acknowledge the poet’s indebtedness rather than his agency.  That is 
to say that it is the engagement, which Hill’s language and images in “Merlin” so deftly 
depict, as a process, not the accomplished fact of the poem, which is heroic.  The choice 
of meter embodies the other half of Hill’s “understanding:” “diligence / and attention, 
appropriately understood / as actuated self-knowledge.”  The reticence of Hill’s meter 
embodies that consideration that is deference rather than a mode of the egotistical 
sublime.   
In the instance of “Merlin,” the poetic meter acknowledge that, as Hill explains in 
“The Tartar’s Bow and the Bow of Ulysses,”   
language, even as it takes the measure of things, falls short.  Its various 
formalities, syntax, prosody, etc., are enacted partly within the domain of a 
paradox: that its limitations and inadequacies are defined by its own 
cogency and eloquence; but there remain circumstances which baffle all 
attempts at definition.
39
 
In its rehandling of the relationship between the moment of the poem and the priority of 
tradition through the diligence and attention of its conventional figures and images, 
“Merlin” acknowledges and operates with an awareness that language’s “limitations and 
inadequacies” are, at least partly, a function of the “cogency and eloquence” of the dead.  
Hill’s meter acknowledges that language “falls short” by its suggestion of, and restraint 
from, the pure heroic couplet.  The poem’s entire form enacts the paradox of language’s 
limitations. 
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Hill’s technique in “Merlin” embodies the same pragmatic rehearsal of the dead 
that he argues for in his essay on John Donne’s verse epistles, “Caveats Enough in their 
Own Walks” (1991).  Hill begins his consideration of Donne’s epistles by making a 
distinction between those authors “who, while concurring with Bacon’s ‘Caveats ynough 
in their own walkes’, nonetheless treat the caveat itself as one of many pertinent 
commonplaces and those whose concurrence is embodied in the contexture of the style 
itself.”
40
  This marks a distinction between the expression and the act, between a poem 
whose subject is to consider and a poem that, as we have seen in “Merlin,” “will 
consider” in its style and so becomes a mediation and judgement upon tradition.  Thus, 
Donne’s final verse epistle of 1604, “To Sir Henry Wotton,” “acts as the diligent 
secretary to its own moral images and examples, referring in order of status, as though at 
some cabinet of privileged responsibility, to the ‘reverend papers’ bearing ‘Our good and 
great Kings lov’d hand and fear’d name’, the ‘learned papers’ of the scholar-diplomat 
himself, the ‘loving papers’, the farewell letters of friends and well-wishers, and finally 
the ‘honest paper’ of Donne’s own valedictory, which both serves and subsumes the 
rest.”
41
  In this manner, Hill shows Donne’s moral allegiances to be inscribed in the 
texture of his verse: “to claim that his [Donne’s] particular poetic virtue leaves not a 
hair’s-breadth between moral principles and poetic practice is a half-truth unless one adds 
that his practice is to find fit expression for the unfittedness of ‘Countries, Courts, 
Towns’ to lives of rectitude.”
42
  Hill finds in Donne that ethical enactment that Hill, 
himself, embodies in his poetic practice.  Hill gives assent in his own enactment of that 
“hair’s-breadth” between a responsible judgement and a “half-truth” in the dash that 
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maintains the separation of these compound nouns.  Because of the inherence of moral 
virtue within poetic practice, “language is more than a discrete courier between de facto 
circumstance and de jure commitments.  As much as a man himself, a man’s language is 
‘enter’d into very intrinsecal Familiarity’ with ‘dangerous matter’.”
43
  Hill’s transition 
from the consideration of Donne’s epistles to the more purely theoretical proposition—
beginning “language is”—enacts the active moral implications of Hill’s own engagement 
with tradition in its technical response to that engagement in Donne: 
In addressing his friend [Henry Wotton] Donne undertakes, at a deeper 
level than convention requires, a rehearsal of the traditional understanding 
that, by a study of ‘the short and sure precepts of good example’, a wise 
man prepared himself to face, unperplexed, the manifold perplexities of 
state affairs.  He goes over what must presently be said and done by going 
over again what has many times been said and done, and he puts himself 
to school in the very phrases with which he commends ethical scholarship 
and well-versed moral action.
44
 
Tradition constitutes the ground for utterance in the moment of the poem.  This ground 
takes its shape and is transmitted through language: those “short and sure precepts of 
good example” that Hill’s criticism also puts itself to school on as a curb to the threat of 
cultural amnesia.  The characteristic pun on “well-versed” acknowledges that such 
awareness resides in the texture of language, as evidenced in the texture of Hill’s 
criticism and the images and devices of his poetry. 
Like Donne’s epistles, Hill’s writing, both poetry and criticism, rehearses 
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tradition in the moment of its utterance.  For Hill, as for Donne, that rehearsal is an 
acknowledgement of obligations to tradition that must be negotiated in the present 
circumstance.  Insofar as the writing enacts such engagement, it maintains not a “hair’s-
breadth” between “moral principles and poetic practice.”  Style and contexture interact to 
make the utterance an ethical response to the obligation to tradition and to the 
requirements of circumstance; “a poet’s words and rhythms [become] not his utterance so 
much as his resistance” to the inertia of language embodied in Hill’s “outnumbering 
dead” and to the coercion of a cultural amnesia that would maintain “they are gone.”
45
  
Instead, Hill visits the “long barrows,” the structures of the language of tradition.  By 
rehearsing tradition, Hill’s writings ground their resistance in a past that authorizes the 
present.  This acknowledgement of indebtedness is the primary characteristic of Hill’s 
poetic ethics. 
Because of Hill’s insistence upon works, the poem contains the poet’s moral 
principles in the workings of its language and figures: that which is resisted can only be 
known through an acknowledgement of resistance, much as the presence of tradition in 
“Merlin” was made known through the poem’s resistance to the “overwhelming tide” of 
the dead and through its recuperation of their lost voices.  In the more familiar 
formulation: “by their works ye shall know them.”  Such an apprehension stands at the 
center of The Triumph of Love: 
On chance occasions— 
and others have observed this—you can see the wind, 
as it moves, barely a separate thing, 
the inner wall, the cell, of an hourglass, humming 
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vortices, bright particles in dissolution, 
a roiling plug of sand picked up 
as a small dancing funnel.  It is how  
the purest apprehension might appear  
to take corporeal shape.
46
 
Again in VI: 
Between bay window and hedge the impenetrable holly 
strikes up again the taut wintery vibrations. 
The hellebore is there still, 
half-buried; the crocuses are surviving. 
From the front room I might be able to see 
the coal fire’s image planted in a circle 
of cut-back rose bushes.  Nothing is changed  
by the strength of this reflection. 
Both passages consider the complex relationship between a poet, a past, and a present 
that are all embodied in the same language; yet both poems also negotiate that 
consideration through a consideration of tradition that Hill responsibly rehearses in an 
allusive idiom.  As in “Merlin,” tradition is not allowed to overwhelm the “strength of 
this reflection”; rather, it becomes the means by which “the purest apprehensions might 
appear / to take corporeal shape.”  The distinction that these two passages represent 
obtains in the different activities which they “consider”: “reflection” and “apprehension.”  
These actions become the style, just as consideration orders “Merlin.”  Hill argues in 
“Dryden’s Prize Song” (1991) that style is “a seamless contexture of energy and order 
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which, time after time, the effete and the crass somehow contrive to part between them; 
either paying tremulous lip-service to the ‘incomparable’ and the ‘incommunicable’ or 
else toadying to some current notion of the ‘demotic’.”
47
  The energy of a poetic response 
to circumstance requires the constraints of an ordering principle in order to avoid the 
irresponsible solipsism of a lax Romantic mode.  In “Merlin,” the energy of “consider” 
generates the order of its dominant tropes and images in such a way that tradition is 
acknowledged without overwhelming the verse.  Style reconciles the “extreme form of 
the problem all poets face: in making a choice one is drawing down, as though by natural 
gravity, that which one has not chosen but which is an inextricable part of the 
‘circumstance’.”
48
  This is the particular difficulty that circumstance places upon the poet, 
which Hill considers in his essay “Unhappy Circumstances” (1991).  Responsible poetry 
requires an ordering principle; yet that ordering principle, insufficiently resisted or 
unconsciously accepted, can overwhelm the energy of the verse.  In “Merlin,” Hill 
accepts the historical weight of implication inherent in “locusts” and “covering tide,” the 
inevitable echoes of the ubi sunt motif in “Arthur, Elaine, Mordred; they are all gone,” 
the aural correspondences between “long,” “barrows,” and “Logres,” and the feudal 
implications of “pinnacle” as “the gifts, the things given or given up, the données, of 
language itself.”
49
  The données of tradition order both the manner and the matter of 
Hill’s consideration: a way of considering tradition that resists an easy acquiescence to 
the “natural gravity” language. 
In sections IX and VI from The Triumph of Love, Hill restrains the expression of 
the de facto instance of the poem, drawing attention, instead, to the indebtedness of their 
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making.  As Hill explains in “The Absolute Reasonableness of Robert Southwell” (1979), 
“style is not simply the manner in which a writer ‘says what he has to say’; it is also the 
manner of his choosing not to say.  There is a distinction to be drawn here between the 
manner of not-saying and the demeanour of silence.”
50
  Hill finds value in Southwell’s 
restraint in the face of circumstance, and there is often much that should remain 
consciously unsaid in the process of ordering poetic energy.  In Hill’s reading of 
Southwell, what is restrained is the (understandable) animosity of an English Jesuit 
towards the prelacy during the sixteenth century.  It is this energy brought under the order 
of Christian and civil polity that characterizes Southwell’s accomplishment.  These 
sections from The Triumph of Love, like the images from “Merlin,” are concerned with 
engaging that which passes unsaid as a way of retrieving tradition from the threat of 
cultural amnesia.  What remains unsaid in these passages is, again, that tradition 
underwrites the matter under Hill’s consideration.  Rather than the poem as fait accompli, 
these poems remain meditative and attentive in their considerations, assaying the subject 
of tradition. 
In VI, Hill engages with the Romantic paradigm by recalling Romantic figures in 
a Romantic idiom.  In structure, the poem traces the common Romantic epistemological 
narrative, familiar in “Tintern Abbey,” the “Intimations” ode, “Dejection: An Ode,” and 
many others: a movement of the poet’s perception from external nature to a consideration 
of that image in the poet’s mind as a product of the imagination.  The poet’s perception 
moves from the “bay window” outward to the “impenetrable holly,” the “hellebore,” and 
the “crocuses.”  Further, the poet endows these external objects with the condition of his 
own circumstance.  Previously the poet has introduced the reader to the immediate 
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circumstance of these reflections: a vague awareness of historical guilt (“Guilts were 
incurred in that place,” II) such as would make the external world an “impenetrable” 
barrier to redemption; and a concern with mortality and impotency (“Ever more 
protracted foreplay,” IV; “Obstinate old man—senex / sapiens, it is not. What is he 
saying: / why is he still so angry?” V), which accounts for the poet’s projection of the 
vegetation’s endurance: “the hellebore is there still, / half-buried; the crocuses are 
surviving” (emphasis mine).  From these figures of self-projection and the pathetic 
fallacy, the paradigmatic Romantic poem would reverse this expansive gesture, delving 
into the mind of the poet which these projections intimate.  
Hill’s poem, instead, maintains a distinction between nature and the mind of man 
through the conventional figures and idioms of Romanticism.  In Coleridge’s “Frost at 
Midnight,” with which Hill’s poem shares common cause and mode, such the 
conventional Romantic narrative depicts the restoration of the poet’s powers of 
apprehension through the poet’s anticipation of his child’s own sympathetic response to 
nature. The structure of Hill’s poem reiterates the structure of Coleridge’s position.  In 
both, the poet sits before the fire looking out a window onto a winter scene.  Coleridge 
overtly acknowledges the self-projection he engages in: “Methinks,” “gives it dim 
sympathies,” and the way the “film” fluttering on the grate mimics his own mental 
fluttering “making it a companionable form” become “by its own moods interprets… 
echo or mirror seeking itself.”  This is the threat—one similar to that which Hill 
acknowledges in “Merlin”—introduced by Hill’s own self-projections.  This is the 
primary threat of any engagement with tradition in Hill’s verse: in the act of judgement 
that is verse, the poet might lack the rectitude of judgement to avoid the complacency of 
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remaking the world in the poet’s own image.  In “Frost at Midnight,” the poet moves 
from a state of dejection to romanticizing the past (his grammar school days), to finding 
comfort in the assumption that the “cradled infant” will soon experience similarly 
unimpeded access to nature and inspiration.  Hill’s language acknowledges the appeal of 
such escapism in the pathetic fallacies which open the poem, but it turns, at the crucial 
Romantic juncture of introspection, and distances itself from the act by switching to the 
subjunctive imperative (a technique similar to that in “Merlin:” “should they to come 
together to be fed”): “I might be able” (emphasis mine).  This “might” acknowledges the 
strength and appeal of the Romantic tradition of the poet-prophet; yet it also repudiates 
that disposition.  Hill’s poem eschews this resolution, instead taking as its object of 
consideration the state of dejection in which Coleridge’s poem begins: 
The frost performs its secret ministry, 
Unhelped by any wind.  The owlet’s cry 
Came loud—and hark, again! loud as before. 
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest, 
Have left me to that solitude, which suits 
Abstruser musings: save that at my side 
My cradled infant slumbers peacefully.   
‘Tis calm indeed! so calm, that it disturbs 
And vexes meditation with its strange 
And extreme silentness.  Sea, hill, and wood, 
This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood, 
With all the numberless goings on of life, 
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Inaudible as dreams! the thin blue flame 
Lies on my low burnt fire, and quivers not; 
Only that film, which fluttered on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing. 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live, 
Making it a companionable form, 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, everywhere 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of thought.
51
  
In reconsidering the Romantic figure of the Aeolian harp as a figure of inspiration, Hill’s 
“taut wintery vibrations,” in VI, announces an engagement with the Romantic tradition 
through an acknowledgement of its influence.  Where the genius of Nature would 
animate the poet in the Romantic mode, here it is the genius of the Romantic mode itself 
that animates the poet.  It also recasts of the “circumstance” of Coleridge’s poem.  Where 
Coleridge’s meditation proceeds “unhelped by any wind,” Hill’s poem takes ordering the 
energies of tradition as its inspiration.  As Hill noted of Wordsworth’s “Immortality” ode 
in his essay “Redeeming the Time” (1972), “if language is more than a vehicle for the 
transmission of axioms and concepts, rhythm is correspondingly more than a 
physiological motor.  It is capable of registering, mimetically, deep shocks of 
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recognition.”
52
  By adopting and resisting Romantic modes and figures, Hill mimetically 
registers a recognition of his own indebtedness to Romanticism even as he draws a 
distinction between the two projects.  In picking up the “demotic” cadences of speech, 
through the manipulation of line break and punctuation—an uncommon occurrence in 
Hill, whose syntax typically tends towards the more circuitous Miltonic line—Hill offers 
us the clarity of Wordsworth’s “selection of language really used by men”: 
A use of words; a rhetoric 
As plain as spitting on a stick; 
Speech from the ice, the clear obscure; 
The tongue broody in the jaw.
53
  
By deploying the Romantic idiom, Hill acknowledges the common appeal of both 
the Romantic stance and the egalitarian principles inscribed in their poetic practice.  
However, Hill also recognizes the insufficiency of such a poetics.  Rather than 
reconciling “human vision” with “the energies… of a non-human cosmos,” the poet’s 
appropriate horizon of concern remains reconciling “human vision” with a frequently 
inhumane human past. Thus within the quintessentially Romantic poem is a counter-
strain that insists upon the world’s objective permanence unaffected by the concerns of 
the poet.   
In Hill’s reconsideration of Romantic sympathy, there is embedded the perennial 
assertion of Hill’s that “the dead maintain their ground— / That there’s no getting 
round.”
54
  Frequently, as with “impenetrable holly,” these images of intractability are 
coupled with images of natural permanence and endurance.  Again, from “The Distant 
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Fury of Battle”: 
Who in places vitally rest, 
Named, anonymous; who test 
Alike the endurance of yews 
Laurels, moonshine, stone, all tissues [;] 
and from “Elegiac Stanzas”: “Mountains, monuments, all forms / Inured to processes and 
storms.”  Rather than Romantic introspection, for Hill the world, and tradition and history, 
which constitute the “tissues” of the world, are the subjects of his consideration.  The 
implicit temptation that the Romantic mode offers still remains in the coal fire’s 
suggestion of the Shelleyan image of inspiration.  The image is also intimate with the 
poet’s anxiety about his own continuing vitality: “the coal fire’s image planted in a circle 
/ of cut-back rose bushes.”  However the immediately physical quality of the plosives in 
“back” and “bushes,” the artificiality implicit in the way the image is “planted,” and the 
way “cut-back” is literally cut-back by the typography of the dash reinforces the 
immediateness and self-sufficiency of nature in the face of a poet’s “abstruser musing.”  
The physicality of Hill’s practice “registers mimetically” the recognition of 
Romanticism’s insufficiency.  “Nothing is changed / by the strength of this reflection,” 
where reflection is multivocally associating the inscribed image, the poet’s musings, and 
the verse itself as a reflection of and upon the Romantic project.  This compaction 
emphasizes the inseparable relationship in Hill’s work between utterance and echo, 
“diligence / and attention,” as the enactment of an ethical obligation to “consider” 
tradition.  The image at once acknowledges the influence of tradition within the ethical 
judgement of the poem (just as “taut wintery vibrations” had acknowledged the Aeolian 
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harp motif while recasting it), represents that judgement, and is that act of judgement. 
This is similar to the way that the images of the locusts or the pinnacled corn in “Merlin” 
simultaneously consider and enact an engagement with the dead.  Nothing is changed 
either by the speaker’s might, as both an indicator of the condition and a version of 
“strength,” or by the vividness of the image itself because, as Hill notes in “Poetry as 
‘Menace’ and ‘Atonement’,” the “tendency [of his verse] to ‘swim up against the stream’ 
of much current thinking about the nature and function of poetry is itself a minor 
Romantic trait.”
55
  Though Hill here rejects the “major Romanticism of our time,” the 
texture of his verse also acknowledges that the very act of repudiation is itself “a minor 
Romantic trait” contained in Romanticism itself.  Yet “unrecognized is /not 
unacknowledged.  Unnamed is not nameless.”
56
  Although the influence of Romanticism 
remains obliquely unsaid, the ethical judgement of the poem acknowledges its 
importance through the manner by which the poem’s texture reconsiders the Romantic 
mode. 
As Hill’s consideration of poetic apprehension proceeds in The Triumph of Love, 
that understanding begins to take the more “corporeal shape” intimated in the 
reconsideration of Romanticism.  In IX, apprehension is considered again through the 
metaphor of wind, this time generated by the falling sand of an hourglass vibrating the 
“inner wall.”  As with the locusts and pinnacled corn in “Merlin” or the coal fire in VI, 
Hill’s image in IX is both a figure of apprehension and the enactment of his consideration 
of apprehension.  If the “circumstance” of VI, which resulted in Hill’s engagement with 
Romanticism, necessitated an emphasis on the immediate and the physical, part of the 
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reason “nothing is changed / by the strength of [that] reflection” is that such an emphasis 
forces a negotiation of Christian dualism like that found in George Herbert’s “Church 
Monuments,” with which Hill’s poem keeps company.  This dualism reasonably presents 
a problem for a poet like Hill who, as we have seen, insists that language incorporates the 
immateriality of tradition.  Like the coal fire, Hill’s image has the hospitality not “to 
sever the good fellowship of dust,” this time between Hill and the Metaphysical tradition: 
Dear flesh, while I do pray, learn here thy stem 
And true descent, that, when thou shalt grow fat, 
 
And wanton in thy cravings, thou mayst know 
That flesh is but the glass which holds the dust 
That measures all our time, which also shall 
Be crumbled into dust.  Mark here below 
How tame these ashes are, how free from lust, 
That thou mayst fit thyself against thy fall.
57
  
In considering the dualist dilemma, Hill removes Herbert’s metaphor of the 
hourglass from its immediate moral implications, but retains the fundamental 
correspondences of the image.  The glass still, loosely, corresponds with body; the dust 
still corresponds with spirit or animus.  However, Hill’s image does not accept the 
submission and, ultimately, relinquishment of the body that Herbert advocates.  Instead, 
Hill’s image insists that spirit animates body; just as ethical judgement should animate 
the physicality of language in poetry.  Part of this consideration upon the commingling of 
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the material and the immaterial inherent in Metaphysical poetry is the grace of common 
constraint that Hill announces in the poem’s opening. 
For Hill, who, like Herbert, strives to transform the material fact of the poem into 
the immaterial expression that is prayer, the difficult dualism to be overcome is how to 
reconcile the material, connotative fact of language with both the immaterial tradition 
that the poem embodies and the immaterial apprehension that the poem enacts.  Because 
of this difficulty, it is both fateful—“On chance occasions”—and an “action of grace,” 
through the “shock of semantic recognition” that is also “ethical recognition,” that 
“others have observed this” difficulty.  Hill’s consideration maintains the autonomous 
existence of the object of apprehension—an insistence consistent with his judgement of 
the autonomy of nature in VI—even as the language which describes that object becomes 
increasingly immaterial and figurative.  Hill begins with the bald statement “you can see 
the wind,” which is allowed, through the combination of comma and line break, to stand 
a moment as the sole object of contemplation before the introduction of the complication: 
“as it moves, barely a separate thing.”  Here, the texture of the verse maintains the wind’s 
separateness even as its language begins to complicate that apprehension through the 
introduction of “circumstance.”   
The problem with seeing the wind, like acknowledging the dead or enacting 
ethical judgments in language, is that the wind is “barely a separate thing” from that 
which it moves.  The spiritual and material are almost inseparable insofar as, in human 
experience, spirituality is always embodied.  In VI, this complication, announced in “taut 
wintery vibrations,” leads to Romantic solipsism.  Here, Herbert’s image and Hill’s 
apprehension of it are barely separate things from the material fact of language which 
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both poets animate.  As the image proceeds, it becomes increasingly difficult to extricate 
cause from effect.  The language embodies the wind’s energies within the particles of 
sand: “humming / vortices,” “bright particles in dissolution”; until the wind is lost as a 
distinct object and dissolves into the sand and the simile: “a roiling plug of sand picked 
up / as a small dancing funnel.”  Herbert’s influence has been similarly dissolved and 
incorporated.  Hill’s “small dancing funnel” arises from Herbert’s tame ashes; yet it bears 
little overt resemblance to them.  The progression of the verse insists upon memory and 
diligent attention to maintain the wind’s energy to which we are returned in the 
concluding lines: “It is how / the purest apprehension might appear / to take corporeal 
shape.”  The descent of the lines reverses the process of dissolution.  From the “how” that 
considers the ultimate immateriality of the white space to the more specific, if no less 
immaterial, “purest apprehension,” to, finally, the emphasis that “corporeal shape” places 
upon the physical, the structure of Hill’s verse returns us to the embodied fact of 
Herbert’s metaphysical considerations and to the embodied consideration of that fact in 
Hill’s poem.  Hill responds to Herbert’s separation of animus and body by embodying his 
response in the physicality of the poem.  The “corporeal shape” of the poem’s structures 
embody the apprehension, gained through “diligence / and attention,” of both “actuated 
self-knowledge” and “what is owed the dead.” 
Through such “understanding” Hill distances himself from the traditional 
positions embodied in the images under consideration (the coal fire and the hourglass).  
However, these poems create that considered position of distance by “a rehearsal of the 
traditional understanding.” “By a study of ‘the short and sure precepts of good 
example’,” Hill prepares himself for “what must presently be said and done.”  In The 
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Triumph of Love, this comes in the creation of a metaphor for Hill’s own apprehension of 
the necessary relationship within poetry between a writer’s “resistance” to 
“circumstance” and the “natural gravity” that language exerts upon utterance as a 
function of both its historical indebtedness and its quotidian existence.  The poet has been 
descanting on the “moral landscape” in the sections just prior to LII, bemoaning the state 
of the age: 
Admittedly at times this moral landscape 
to my exasperated ear emits 
archaic burrings like a small, high-fenced 
electricity sub-station of uncertain age 
in a field corner where the flies 
gather and old horses shake their sides.
58
 
To which the poet’s presiding genius, Angelus Novus, responds, 
But leave it now, leave it; as you left 
a washed-out day at Stourport or the Lickey, 
improvised rainhats mulch for papier-mâché, 
and the chips floating. 
Leave it now, leave it; give it over 
to that all-gathering general English light, 
in which each separate bead 
of drizzle at its own thorn-tip stands 
as revelation.
59
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Within the seeming abdication which Angelus Novus suggests there is the implication of 
an art derived from “circumstance”: that “rainhats” may become “mulch for papier-
mâché.”  While the poet may “leave it,” what is left (both in the sense of relinquish and 
remain) might become the substance of new art, much as The Triumph of Love finds the 
springs of poetry in quotidian and obscurantist mid-century history.  The bead of drizzle 
becomes a figure for Hill’s poetic practice: an utterance at once immaterial and corporeal 
shaped by the historical weight of its own language and by the “natural gravity” of 
“circumstance.”  
Even as Hill insists upon the poem’s “resistance” to the inertia and coercion of 
language, poetry, at least accomplished poetry, is enacted in the context of that quotidian 
“all-gathering general English light” that is tradition.  As we have seen in Hill’s criticism 
and verse, poetry responds to its historical circumstance in part by acknowledging the 
“natural gravity” of tradition within language.  Further, it is in the poetic structures and 
texture of the verse that such understandings are enacted.  In “each separate bead / of 
drizzle” Hill offers an image of the corporeal embodiment of apprehension that is itself 
an apprehension.  It is the “natural gravity” that creates the shape of the bead even as it is 
the “natural gravity” of language that creates the poetic structure in which “revelation” 
stands, itself almost a separate bead,” at the line end of the final line.  The context of 
tradition and present circumstance is the frame in which poetry stands as revelation.  
Hill’s engagement with tradition in the texture of his verse is inseparable from the ethical 
obligation that such an engagement brings upon the self.  The dynamic of engagement 
with tradition and circumstance orders the energy of poetic judgement.  Because the 
institutions of language and present circumstance are historical, ethically responsible 
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poetry must begin with an embodied apprehension of its own historicity. 
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Chapter II: “POETRY AS SALUTATION” 
It is the awareness of language’s indebtedness that grounds Hill’s position as a 
“politicized aesthete.”  The subject of Hill’s poetry is, most frequently, the consideration 
of tradition and history with a responsible awareness of their alterity.  The work of the 
poet is to engage with that alterity and, thus, draw upon the poetic resources of tradition.  
However, as Hill notes in his essay on R.S. Thomas, the work of poetry involves the poet 
in the public sphere in which the poem is enacted: 
speaking as a politicized aesthete, I suggest that what we are pleased to 
call the truth of poetry resides in forms of coinherence that are drawn from, 
and relapse into, incoherence…. The truth of poetry is in part corruption 
and contamination, in part a field of reference by which to interpret an 
unknown language, in part the unknown language itself.  Poetry as 
utterance—both genuine and fraudulent—is part of ‘the common behavior 
of mankind’, even though people are commonly oblivious to its peculiar 
attractions and demands.
60
 
Hill’s delineation of the “tripartite nature of creativity” describes the poetic 
practice which we have been examining.  As the sections from The Triumph of Love 
evidence, poetry is necessarily “in part corruption and contamination.”  To some extent, 
history and tradition are always given over to corruption in the “tongue’s atrocities”
61
 of 
the poem.  They are corrupted by the appropriation that poetry requires, and they threaten 
to contaminate the poetic utterance with their overwhelming influence.  The Romantic 
idiom contaminates Hill’s consideration of the metaphysical status of tradition within 
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language in VI from The Triumph of Love; yet that idiom is also contaminated by what 
Hill calls the “hefting” and “tuning” of language.
62
   
In his essay, “The Tartar’s Bow and the Bow of Ulysses,” Hill address the way 
that Renaissance writers like Donne, Marvell, Milton, and Hobbes, “heft” and “tune” 
inherited language in order to negotiate particular meanings out from the quotidian 
connotations of words.  In doing so, their language acknowledges the inertia of tradition 
and the coercion of common speech in the process of clearing their own meanings.  
Words, in the ethical act of writing, must do the “hefting” and “tuning” work through 
which the writer resists either the “outnumbering dead” or the cultural amnesia of present 
circumstance.  Language accretes meaning as writers tune language’s historicity to 
present circumstance.  As Hill explains, the tuning of language is “something more than 
the Lockian ability to put words in their place.  It has more affinity… with George 
Herbert’s ‘being true to [the] business’.”
63
  Hill’s poetry and criticism address and 
emphasize the negotium that is the nature of the poet’s craft: “a minor problem left 
unmastered… comes to exercise a disproportionate advantage, and in the art of poetry, it 
is so often the effortless that impedes.”
64
  It is in acts of language that Hill labors to 
“heft” and “tune” his utterance between the inertia of language’s historical indebtedness 
and the coercions of language’s present circumstances: 
the ‘tuning’ faculty involves tuning out as well as tuning in.  The extent to 
which any writer is, or is not, aware of ‘overtone’, ‘harmonics’, in the 
language, the degree to which it is possible, necessary, or desirable for a 
reader to ‘hear’ the harmonics are matters for nice speculation.  Should I, 
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or should I not, for instance, in my own choice of ‘hefting’, try to tune out 
all recollection of Leontes’ ‘violent hefts’ in Act II, scene I, of The 
Winter’s Tale?  I would agree that a judicious weighing of one’s words 
might find intolerable such a grotesque notion.  On the other hand, an 
image of violent psychic and physical nausea is not inappropriate to an 
account of the always exhausting, at times mortifying and ignominious, 
struggle with language.
65
 
Even within the formulation of a principle for the poet’s way with language, Hill puts his 
own language to work “defining and yet again defining”
66
 (“‘overtone’, ‘harmonics’” or 
“possible, necessary, or desirable”) the exact deployment of his terms “tuning” and 
“hefting.”  He at once acknowledges the potential for “heft” to heft up and foist Leontes’ 
words into the mind of the reader.  He then tunes in and tunes out that previous utterance 
in a negotiation between present circumstance—“a judicious weighing of one’s words” as 
though before a tribunal—and the self’s concurrence with the not-self of the previous 
utterance—“an image of violent psychic and physical nausea is not inappropriate…” (this 
last caveat being an utterance of the poet’s experience within language that has found its 
historical echo in Leontes’ speech).   
At the same time, the appropriateness of the reader’s hearing such echoes is 
relegated to “nice speculation,” a phrase that could subordinate the reader to the position 
of a mere voyeur or, as Hill’s succeeding “nice speculation” evidences, a phrase which 
emphasizes the tediousness and laboriousness of the poet’s craft in trying to heft and tune 
words so that we become aware of the ethical quality of the act.  For we see Hill, in the 
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space between “I would agree” and “on the other hand,” considering the reader’s 
response: what one “might find intolerable” and what might “not [be] inappropriate.”  We 
have seen the same kind of “hefting” and “tuning” by and of words at work already in the 
“Now, should they come together to be fed” of “Merlin,” and in the work that “might” 
and the poetic structure are asked to perform in VI and IX from The Triumph of Love.  
These acts embody the poet’s scrupulousness with language that is a recognition that the 
words are not his own: “one is true to one’s aim by taking one’s true aim in the measures 
of a craft that is at once intimately one’s own and not one’s own.”
67
  Hill’s obligation 
consists in connecting present circumstance with its historical antecedents by enacting the 
continuity between language’s historicity and its deployment in the present circumstance 
of the poem. This is the critical response to the predicament acknowledged in “Merlin” 
and sections VI and IX from The Triumph of Love, where tradition and common 
assumption might either overwhelm the present or be entirely erased by it.  The threat of 
contamination, which requires a writer’s “hefting” and “tuning” of language, results from 
language’s status as that “not-self” to which the self must rise into concurrence.  The not-
self of tradition might contaminate the poet’s utterance to such a degree that the poem 
becomes a corruption.  Conversely, the self might so contaminate the language through 
historical ignorance that the poem, again, becomes a corruption. 
It is because of this alterity of language that the “truth of poetry” is also “a field of 
reference by which to interpret an unknown language.”  It is through the poet’s working 
in language that the poem becomes a “field of reference” for negotiating between the 
“unknown language” of tradition and assumption and the “unknown language” of the self.  
As we have seen, Hill’s scrupulous poetic practice attempts to place the historical 
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indebtedness of language, its fundamental alterity, before the reader.  The diligence and 
attention given to resisting the inertia and coercion of language is, at root, an act of 
clarifying interpretation.  The scrupulousness with which Hill treats language’s historical 
indebtedness is a function of his understanding that language is “intimately one’s own 
and not one’s own.”  Acts of “hefting” and “tuning” interpret language’s alterity in such a 
way that “from the depths of the self we rise to a concurrence with that which is not-
self”
68
 rather than appropriating what is “not one’s own.” 
This poetic practice of maintaining and considering tradition in its alterity and 
then of scrupulously engaging that alterity so that, in the poem which results, the self of 
the poet comes to a concurrence with the not-self of language is problematic.  For if 
language’s alterity establishes itself as an “unknown language,” then the new utterance 
that results from such engagement is “in part the unknown language itself.”  In rising to a 
concurrence with the not-self, the poem exhibits “the alienness of poetic statement”
69
 that 
Hill, in “Caveats Enough in their Own Walks,” understands as intrinsic to the act of 
utterance: 
If I say that all writers are bound to work with relative proportions of 
‘hefting’ words to ‘tuning’ words I must immediately add that Hobbes’ 
caveat ‘all metaphors are by profession equivocal’ still applies and that the 
same word may satisfy either attribute at one time or another: it is a matter 
of the drift and occasion and contexture of the speech.
70
 
In a more Empsonian vein, Hill acknowledges the predicament from the position 
of the critic who is also the poet: “I constantly propose to myself that the intrinsic value 
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of the poem is securely demonstrable; in my experience, however, the clinching 
demonstration is one of the most difficult achievements in the field of poetics.”
71
  What 
both of these passages maintain, I would argue, is an intimate awareness that even one’s 
own poems are “intimately one’s own and not one’s own.”  Hill’s “it is a matter of the 
drift…” and in the distance between his “securely demonstrable” and “one of the most 
difficult achievements” accepts language’s alterity—even if it is one’s own—and asserts 
that the “intrinsic value of a poem” resides in the labor of engaging that alterity 
responsibly. 
Through this engagement, the poem becomes that aesthetic enactment before the 
body politic that is the role of the “politicized aesthete,” so long as we understand politics 
in the deepest sense of polis.  This is, of course, consistent with the way Hill returns us to 
notions of the body politic by returning us to commonweal and res publica—literally, 
from the Latin, “public things.”  In his position as poet, Hill understands a responsibility 
to diagnose the peculiar predicaments of modernity; yet in his poetic practice Hill also 
enacts a solution to those predicaments.  Because Hill’s poems embody and enact their 
response to this civic obligation, Hill stresses a distinction between the appreciation the 
poem receives as an object and the appreciation the poet receives as creator: 
One is left with the awkward observation that the acceptance of a principle 
of penitential humility in the conduct of life does not necessarily inhibit a 
readiness to accept the status of ‘maestro’ conferred by a supportive yet 
coercive public…. I would reply that it is not a matter of ad hominem 
rebuke but a suggestion that fashionable adulation of the ‘maestro’ when 
there is so little recognition of the ‘fabbro’, ‘homo faber’, is one aspect of 
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what C.K. Stead mordantly but not unfairly calls the ‘struggle between 
poets and “poetry-lovers”’, except that the very word ‘struggle’ suggests 
purpose and engagement.
72
 
For Hill, this inert struggle is an aspect of present culture’s adamant complacency and 
ignorance towards poetry, and as such, it poses a particular threat to the poet: “As Jon 
Silkin has remarked, ‘it is not disagreement we have now but deafness’.  Deafness, yes; 
and arbitrary assumption.  To ‘assume’ is literally ‘to take to oneself, adopt, usurp’; and 
the fashion in which society can ‘take up’ and ‘drop’ the poet (as John Clare was taken 
up, and dropped) is a form of usurpation which has little or no connection to intrinsic 
value.”
73
  In the very act of lionizing the poet, of making the “fabbro” into the “maestro,” 
society diminishes the arduousness of poetic making.  This presents a particular threat to 
Hill (though to some extent, I would imagine, all poets share this concern), because his 
peculiar emphasis rests on practice, on the scrupulous making of poetry which 
contributes to its intrinsic value.  The poet’s claim to “maestro” resides in his abilities as 
“fabbro,” for it is a poet’s way with language—that working to rise to a concurrence 
between the self and the not-self—that is the enactment of his ethics.   
For Hill such rigorous engagement with language is the ethical responsibility of 
the poet, insofar as he is an agent in the public sphere.  The poet’s obligation to use 
language responsibly is, to a certain extent, the grounds for his responsibility to the res 
publica: 
It seems to me one of the indubitable signs of Simone Weil’s greatness as 
an ethical writer that she associates the act of writing not with a 
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generalized awareness of sin but with a specific crime, and proposes a 
system whereby ‘anybody, no matter who, discovering an avoidable error 
in a printed text or radio broadcast, would be entitled to bring an action 
before [special] courts empowered to condemn a convicted offender to 
prison or hard labour’.  It may well strike others as unassailable evidence 
that the woman was merely an obsessional neurotic.  Perhaps one could 
phrase the matter more moderately and say that one does not regard it as at 
all eccentric to endorse the view that grammar is a ‘social and public 
institution’, or to share W.K. Wimsatt’s belief in ‘the fullness of [the 
poet’s] responsibility as public performer in a complex and treacherous 
medium’.
74
 
For Hill the most treacherous aspect of this responsibility of the poet’s role as 
“public performer,” or “politicized aesthete,” comes from the inertia and coercion of 
language to appropriate historical violence in the texture of the poem: to commit the 
tongue’s atrocities by speaking atrocities into beauty.  As Hill acknowledges, however, 
that not to speak is an equally irresponsible act, and “in certain contexts, the expansive, 
outward gesture towards the condition of music is a helpless gesture of surrender, oddly 
analogous to that stylish aesthetic of despair, that desire for the ultimate integrity of 
silence, to which so much eloquence has been so frequently and indefatigably devoted.”
75
  
To remain silent, Hill suggests, is to abdicate the poet’s responsibility to engage both 
tradition and history in their capacities as “public and social institution.”  Hill’s “helpless 
gesture” derides a poetic practice that lacks sufficient “negotium of language itself,” and 
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“stylish aesthetic of despair” looks back to that lionizing of the poet as “maestro” while 
ignoring the negotium involved in making the poem.  Instead, Hill’s poetic practice 
maintains the alterity of history and tradition by working to a concurrence between the 
self, which responds through poetry, and the not-self of the public institutions of tradition 
and history.  Beneath these workings there remains the acknowledgement of a public 
sentimentality, from which the poet himself is not immune, that must be resisted.   
The poet’s culpability in that public sentiment, the poet’s awareness of the 
culpability of language itself, creates Hill’s peculiar understanding of the poet’s vocation, 
articulated in “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and ‘Atonement’” (Hill’s statement deserves quoting 
at length): 
in the constraint of shame the poet is free to discover both the ‘menace’ 
and the atoning power of his own art.  However much and however rightly 
we protest against the vanity of supposing it to be merely the ‘spontaneous 
overflow of powerful feelings’, poetic utterance is nonetheless an 
utterance of the self, the self demanding to be loved, demanding love in 
the form of recognition and ‘absolution’.  The poet is perhaps the first to 
be dismayed by such a discovery and to seek the conversion of his 
‘daemon’ to a belief in altruistic responsibility.  But this dismay is as 
nothing compared to the shocking encounter with ‘empirical guilt’, not as 
a manageable hypothesis, but as an irredeemable error in the very 
substance and texture of his craft and pride.  It is here that he knows the 
affliction of ‘being fallen into the “they”’ and yet it is here that his 
selfhood may be made at-one with itself.  He may learn to live in his 
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affliction, not with the cynical indifference of the reprobate but with the 
renewed sense of a vocation: that of necessarily bearing his peculiar 
unnecessary shame in a world growing ever more shameless.  He may 
‘rise to be a person’ in a society that aggregates and items; he may even 
transfigure and redeem that ‘word-helotry’ to which Dr. George Steiner 
sees the merely literate man ultimately condemned in a culture divided 
between electronic data-processing and music.
76
 
What strikes one immediately about this statement in the context of Hill’s other 
writing is its clarity and force.  While there is the characteristic acknowledgement of a 
predicament, there are none of the puns, quotations, and other complexities of language 
so common in Hill’s style as an essayist.  Instead, in this passage, Hill’s returns us to the 
concerns we have been examining with a renewed and clarified emphasis on the poet as 
an ethical agent in the world.  He depicts the poet caught in the familiar “constraint” 
between the self “demanding love in the form of recognition and ‘absolution’” and an 
“empirical guilt… in the very substance and texture of his craft and pride.”   The 
emphasis of Hill’s language rests on the act, on “the conversion of his ‘daemon’ to a 
belief in altruistic responsibility.”  The “menace” of poetry, as a craft which takes 
language as its medium, is that the poet is always tempted to appropriate historical 
violence under the guise of “altruistic responsibility,” and so to fulfill the self’s desire for 
“love in the form of recognition and ‘absolution’.”  In contrast, Hill acknowledges the 
greater difficulty of the “shocking encounter with ‘empirical guilt’.”  Hill conceives of 
this as something like language’s and the poet’s original sin, an “irredeemable error in the 
very substance and texture of his craft and pride.”  The conjunction in that prepositional 
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phrase is most telling; poetry, cogency and eloquence with language, is the poet’s craft 
and, when done well, his pride.  Because of this, it is a necessary condition of the poetic 
life that any poem may be an act of speciously conceived “altruistic responsibility.”  His 
poems, as aesthetic objects, are necessarily fallen into the “they” of a “society that 
aggregates and items,” into that “‘word-helotry’… in a culture divided between electronic 
data-processing and music.”  The difference for a poet like Hill is that this condition is 
not treated as a “manageable hypothesis” nor does the poet proceed with the “cynical 
indifference of the reprobate”; instead, the poet enacts “his peculiar unnecessary shame” 
in his poetic practice before a “world growing ever more shameless.”  The ethical force 
of Hill’s idiom—“vanity,” “absolution,” “altruistic responsibility,” “empirical guilt,” 
“irredeemable error,” “affliction,” “cynical indifference of the reprobate,” “vocation,” 
“shame,” “shameless,” “condemned”—makes clear that, although poetic practice is under 
consideration, the true concern is with ethics in human life.  For the poet willing to bear 
the responsibility of the poet’s public role, the challenge remains to negotiate between the 
indebtedness of language’s historical guilt and the poet’s desire to satisfy the public 
demand for beautiful poems that will gain him “recognition and ‘absolution’.”  This 
negotiation, for Hill, is an ethical act. 
In the previous chapter we considered Hill’s engagement with history and 
tradition under one aspect of his formulation of “understanding”: “a daily 
acknowledgement / of what is owed the dead.” The nature of that engagement is 
consideration as both diligent attention to the echoes within utterance and as due 
deference to the limitations that the “cogency and eloquence” of those echoes place upon 
the poet.  Thus in VI from The Triumph of Love, we noted that Hill’s language and 
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images reconsidered the Romantic reflection of “nature and the mind of man” in the 
poem’s own consideration of apprehension.  Hill then proceeds, in IX, to consider the 
limitations of the Romantic project through a consideration in and of Metaphysical poetry.  
In this manner, the poetry negotiates an “oxymoron embedded in the inmost texture of 
English writing: the viciousness of virtue when virtue is not called forth to action in the 
negotium of language itself,”
77
 which Hill discusses in “Unhappy Circumstances” (1991).  
This formulation comes out of Hill's consideration, in that essay, of the complications 
arising from the necessity of leisure and the necessity of labor.  The creation of poetry 
requires a certain amount of leisure.  Economic, social, and political freedoms provide the 
poet with time in which to create.  However, at least for Hill, there is nothing leisurely 
about the act of creating poetry.  In this respect, Hill reiterates the classical emphasis on 
negotium as the ethical obligation of the citizen.  The citizen, or "politicized aesthete" in 
Hill's phrase, must work to fulfill his obligation to the res publica.  This ethic poses 
certain problems for the citizen who finds leisure a requirement for his negotium.  In 
poetry, the principal challenge is not to allow the circumstantial otium, which enables the 
creation of poetry, to contaminate the poetry itself.  When this occurs, "that which is 
'laboured' may at the same time be 'otiose' for the 'laboured' may not, in fact, have been 
worked on enough."
78
  When the public work of the citizen remains "otiose," then the 
citizen has failed in his obligation to the res publica.  When this failure occurs in poetry, 
the poem becomes an "utterance of naked will" that "haunts the 'just city', 'res publica', 
poets and philosophers."
79
  Such poetry does not contribute to the res publica because it 
fails to acknowledge "the way in which the formal creative or critical judgement and the 
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inchoate force of circumstance become awkwardly implicated or stand in irreducible 
confrontation.”
80
  When poetry ceases to respond to its own circumstance, either 
positively or negatively, the poet has failed in his civic and ethical obligation.  
The poetry considered in this chapter engages this predicament and embodies 
poetry's responsible negotium.  Rather than being commemorative of specific, historical 
events, like "In Memory of Jane Fraser," "September Song," "Two Formal Elegies," or 
the "In Memoriam" poems, the poems examined here consider the broad ethical 
dilemmas and obligations of a poet who takes the writing of such commemorative poems 
as his civic negotium.  If part of Hill’s position as “politicized aesthete” involves a 
responsible consideration of tradition, then Hill’s discussion of negotium implies that the 
work of poetry is part of the poet’s civic obligation.  Just as tradition requires 
consideration in any responsible act of poetry, the poet must subject his own 
circumstance to the diligent self-scrutiny that is “self-knowledge.”   
In Speech! Speech!, Hill compacts the dynamic between a consideration of 
tradition and self-scrutiny into scrupulosity as the character of ethical poet’s disposition: 
… Scrupulosity 
unnerved so | gelassenheit is a becoming 
right order, heart’s ease, a gift in faith, 
most difficult of freedoms.
81
 
As with Hill’s notion of virtue as enacted in the negotium of language—within which 
“scrupulosity” has its part to play—here Hill works within the paradox of free will’s 
difficult obligations: “most difficult of freedoms.”  Under the condition of free will, the 
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poet may abdicate this civic duty in favor of otium.  Only in a context in which freedom 
makes this choice available can duty and the “scrupulosity” that fulfills that duty have 
any ethical force.  Unless one is free to ignore civic duty, the acceptance of that duty 
cannot have the ethical valuation that Hill understands poetic negotium to have.   In this 
section from Speech! Speech!, as we might expect, Hill’s language and rhythms are 
“capable of registering, mimetically, deep shocks of recognition” as to the true nature of 
scrupulousness. As it does not in “Merlin,” Hill’s language here enacts that 
“scrupulosity” which may have the salutary effect of unnerving one out of preemptory 
judgments.  Yet as the equivocation of his “unnerved so” also enacts—is this “unnerved” 
a verb or an adjective of scrupulosity?—“scrupulosity” may also have the inhibitory 
effect of unnerving one so and leading him to abdicate rigorous engagement in favor of 
complacency.  Hill follows this acknowledgement of a difficulty with a further difficulty, 
“gelassenheit,” in “right order.”  Were Hill to simply maintain the equivocation of 
“Scrupulosity / unnerved so” he would, indeed, evidence that self-skepticism so 
frequently adduced in post-modern literature and in Hill’s work particularly.
82
  However, 
gelassenheit returns us to that diligence and attention that guards against the ready and 
easy way.  Hill’s deployment here, proceeding as it does in “right order,” deftly tunes the 
connotative sense of “composure” towards its affinities with “composition,” reinforcing 
the attention to and the structuring of language as an ethical act.  In doing so, gelassenheit 
enacts the engagement with scrupulosity that is that “most difficult of freedoms.”  For the 
scrupulosity in gelassenheit is “a becoming / right order” in the ethical act of composition 
that is the poem.   
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However, Hill’s language never ignores the temptation of scrupulosity’s more 
insipid recourse to complacency just as, in VI from The Triumph of Love, the Romantic 
mode is never relinquished even as Hill distances himself from that position.  
Gelassenheit (Ger.: “placid”), “heart’s ease,” “a gift in faith,” and “freedom,” in their 
closeness to the complacency that is cliché, demonstrates an awareness of the temptation 
to abdicate responsible labor in favor of complacency, which might yield a “heart’s ease” 
from the unnerving effects of self-scrutiny.  But the paradox of a difficult freedom strains 
too strongly against such complacency.  Through the alliterative and positional 
associations of “faith” and “freedom,” Hill’s practice recalls the difficulty of free will 
when one recognizes free will as carrying a civic obligation.  “Scrupulosity,” as the 
quality of Hill’s engagement with language, is, then, in the “unnerving so” of the poet. It 
is the character of the poet’s negotium while, at the same time, it is that practice which 
keeps otiosity at bay.  The negotium resides in the poet’s engagement with his subject. 
Diligently working at language and tradition comprises Hill’s civic obligation as a 
“politicized aesthete.” For this reason, it is almost impossible to separate the poetic 
subject from the poet’s practice.  It is through “scrupulosity” that Hill reconciles both 
concerns: 
… Scrupulosity can kill 
like inattention.  How will this be judged? 
How shall I plead as one greatly 
gifted with hindsight: those dead and dying 
dropped there to maim the irresistible 
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beauty of the advance?
83
 
Hill both balances “scrupulosity” against that “understanding” from The Triumph of 
Love—an overly ascetic scrupulosity: “More mental | hygiene / urgently call for | to 
forget oneself”
84
—and aligns these two principles as complementary responses to a 
meditative consideration of tradition.  A scrupulousness that can “kill like inattention” is 
not dissimilar from an understanding which makes one forget oneself.  This interplay 
between poet and subject reinforced through its embodiment in the questions the poet 
then proceeds to, and in the temporal markers (“hindsight” and “advance”) that frame the 
difficulty of the circumstance.  Hill moves from the impersonally circumstantial “How 
will this be judged” to the special pleading that announces the enactment of virtue in the 
textures of language: “How shall I plead as one greatly / gifted with hindsight.”  The first 
question begs the reader’s indulgence, or at least anxiously anticipates the judgement 
from circumstances that remain beyond the poet’s control.  It proleptically anticipates its 
own uncertain reception.  In doing so, the question acknowledges the human desire for 
acceptance that can compromise the virtuousness of negotium.  The second question 
returns to the issue of virtue’s manifestation in the “negotium of language itself”—virtues, 
themselves, being données, though they may need to be worked at.  In the ambiguous 
vocalization of “shall,” Hill compacts the emphases on virtue embodied in language and 
the concern with poetry as an “utterance of naked will.”  That “shall,” understood as a 
question of poetic practice, embodies the self-scrutiny of negotium.  Before the poet can 
adequately fulfill his civic obligation through poetry, he must question how to fulfill that 
obligation.  In this sense, the question genuinely enacts Hill’s understanding that poetry’s 
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particular civic negotium is to speak to the present from a knowledge of tradition as “one 
greatly / gifted with hindsight.” However, “shall” should also be understood as a more 
practically rhetorical question: “how can my rhetoric use appeals to authority to validate 
its claims?”  This sense pushes poetry towards the otiose “utterance of naked will.”  
Rather than stemming from the sort of consideration of tradition that Hill practices, 
poetry can, instead, appropriate tradition for its own aesthetic gains.   
In the context of such equivocation, the concluding image unites Hill’s 
consideration of tradition with the importance of scrupulousness.  Just as the anxious 
“How will this be judged” announces the awareness of those contingencies in the present 
circumstance that might mitigate the poem’s negotium and reception, “those dead and 
dying / dropped there to maim the irresistible / beauty of the advance” can either 
represent the responsible negotium of tradition that constitutes Hill’s civic obligation, or 
the image can represent the disingenuous appropriation of tradition’s authority in the 
“utterance of naked will.”  This figure recalls the “pinnacled corn” and Hill’s awareness 
of the threat of cultural amnesia.  Only Hill’s “scrupulosity” guards against the otiose 
appropriation of tradition.  His enactment of virtue in the “negotium of language itself,” 
drops those “dead and dying” in such a way that they must give us pause and, thus, 
“maim the irresistible beauty” of cultural advance.  Hill’s practice forces the reader to 
consider tradition in considering Hill’s poetry, rather than merely appropriating the 
tradition to authorize an utterance of Hill’s or the reader’s naked will.  If the “dead 
maintain their ground,” then Hill’s civic obligation is to force us to consider that tradition 
in the process of advance.   
The “scrupulosity” called up as virtuous engagement with tradition and self, here, 
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achieves what Hill has called “intrinsic quality of style”:  
Intrinsic quality of style is the simultaneous recognition of strength and 
impediment which, as it declares itself triumphantly possessed of such 
knowledge, suffers the ignominious consequences of that possession.  
Even the most unequivocal utterance is affected by the circumstantial and 
contingent matter implicated in our discourse.
85
 
In section 11, “gelassenheit” evidences the recognition of strength by tuning in one 
vocalization of “Scrupulosity / unnerved so” while tuning out another; yet that strength is 
also acknowledged as an impediment in the poet’s reiterative and refining attempt to 
locate the precise meaning of scrupulosity.  As Ezra Pound urged, in a dictum to which 
Hill gives qualified assent in “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and ‘Atonement’,” “the poet’s job is to 
define and yet again define till the detail of the surface is in accord with the root in 
justice.”  The equivocation of “scrupulosity,” which gelassenheit responsibly qualifies, 
embodies Hill’s own understanding of Pound: “From the depths of the self we rise to a 
concurrence with that which is not-self.  For so I read those words of Pound….”
86
  As 
“Merlin,” sections VI and IX from The Triumph of Love, and section 28 from Speech! 
Speech! acknowledge, poetic negotium always occurs in the close constraint between the 
not-self of tradition and the not-self of present circumstance.  This, for Hill, is the 
inevitable nature of the poet’s condition in taking language as his medium: 
that commonplace image, founded upon the unfinished statues of 
Michelangelo, ‘mighty figures straining to free themselves from the 
imprisoning marble’, has never struck me as being an ideal image for 
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sculpture itself; it seems more to embody the nature and condition of those 
arts which are composed of words.  The arts which use language are the 
most impure of arts, though I do not deny that those who speak of ‘pure 
poetry’ are attempting, however inadequately, to record the impact of a 
real effect.  The poet will occasionally, in the act of writing a poem, 
experience a sense of pure fulfillment which might too easily and too 
subjectively be misconstrued as the attainment of objective perfection.  It 
seems less fanciful to maintain that, however much a poem is shaped and 
finished, it remains to some extent within the ‘imprisoning marble’ of a 
quotidian shapelessness and imperfection.
87
 
The texture of Hill’s language in the various formulations of poetic negotium 
(“the most impure of arts, “might too easily and too subjectively,” “ignominious 
consequences,” “implicated,” “the viciousness of virtue,” “the negotium of language 
itself”) should alert us to the fact that, while Hill’s subjects are frequently historical, his 
concerns are always ethical.  The poem, as an ethical act of consideration and as an 
obligation to present circumstance, offers the poet up to judgement  The ethical quality 
that asks to be judged is the “scrupulosity” of the poet’s language in reaching a 
concurrence between the self and the not-self.   
Yet each aspect of language’s otherness, its being both historically other and 
circumstantially other, presents different difficulties and necessitates different 
negotiations.  Hill’s consideration of the historical indebtedness is both “diligence / and 
attention” and a due deference consistent with his understanding of “our obligation as 
informed readers… to take into account both the special pleading and the circumstantial 
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facts.”
88
  The maintenance of the alterity of tradition results in the syncretic, evolutionary 
quality of Hill’s writing.  Where a bald appeal to authority would generate a syllogistic 
quality in which premise “A” from authority and premise “B” from authority are 
combined by the author into a new thesis, Hill’s practice, rather, embodies the poet’s 
growth out of a consideration of tradition in its own context.  The reading of documents 
that generates “informed readers” is not the substance of Hill’s ethics; this comes, most 
fully, when the “special pleading” and the “circumstantial facts” are actively taken into 
account within the contexture of the poem.  As Vincent Sherry explains, 
Hill focuses on that pernicious power by which the hermetic artist can 
transform and falsify the facts of history; concedes the responsibilities of 
the “artistic men” to the common tongue; recognizes the rival claims of 
history and poetry for what they are; indeed makes poems out of that 
tension.  This circumspect view of the problem—and not delight in vatic 
obscurity for its own sake—produces the peculiar but necessarily difficult 
poems.
89
 
Hill recognizes, as Sherry articulately points out, the temptation to appropriate history, to 
“transform and falsify” the circumstances in an attempt to validate an “utterance of naked 
will” through appeal to authority.  Thus Hill’s poetry finds itself in the difficult 
circumstance between ethically unavoidable historical violence and the aesthetic 
demands of the poetic occupation.  For Sherry, “paradoxically, then, Hill’s language 
seeks to be both the medium of aesthetic perfection and a force field of historical 
violence.  If the individual work, as an aesthetic whole, achieves a formal perfection, as 
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such lifting us away from history, its parts are still heavy with history, immersing us in 
the matter of bloody fact.”
90
  Sherry’s paradox, here, captures well that negotiation that 
Hill has defined and yet again defined as “scrupulosity.”  For Hill, “aesthetic perfection” 
can only be attained within “a force field of historical violence,” that confluence of 
“special pleading and the circumstantial facts.”  If one were to quibble at all with 
Sherry—and this is, perhaps, a matter of some import—one might justly question 
whether, for Hill, poetry should ever be allowed to lift us away from history.   
For Hill, quoting Yeats in due deference, “when the poem ‘comes right with a 
click like a closing box’, what is there effected is the atonement of aesthetics with 
rectitude of judgement.”
91
  Sherry’s “both… and” and “as such lifting us away from 
history” more closely resembles the failed self-generation of “Genesis” or the failed 
apotheosis of “God’s Little Mountain”: 
I waited for the word that was not given, 
 
Pent up into a region of pure force, 
Made subject to the pressure of the stars; 
I saw the angels lifted like pale straws [.]
92
 
In both cases, among the things sought in these “mythic quests,” to borrow Hart’s 
phrase, is a wholly undetermined language, a word that is neither coerced nor 
incapacitated by its indebtedness.  In short, a word, a language, “that was not given” by 
either history or present circumstance.  This desire to transcend the historical 
contingencies of language fails and the poet falls back into language and history: “So, the 
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fifth day, I turned again / To flesh and blood and the blood’s pain”
93
; 
I could not stand before those winnowing eyes 
 
And fell, until I found the world again. 
Now I lack the grace to tell what I have seen; 
For though the head frames words the tongue has none. 
And who will prove a surgeon to this stone?
94
  
While a tedious distinction to make with otherwise cogent criticism—and, in fairness to 
Sherry, it is more evident in the development of Hill’s poetry than in the early collections 
specifically under his purview—,nonetheless, the distinction between transcending 
history and immersing oneself in the contexture of historical circumstance is central to 
Hill’s understanding of the ethical negotium of poetry.  Thus one might, reservedly, 
revise Sherry’s paradox, and say that Hill’s language seeks aesthetic perfection through 
the operation of scrupulous judgement within the force field of historical violence.  This 
insistence upon the enactment of judgement in historical circumstance is, more exactly, 
that tension whence poetry arises, and why Hill’s poems “are still heavy with history, 
immersing us in the matter of bloody fact.” There is no fall into language for Hill; rather 
the bloody and redemptive matter of history is inevitably inherent in the poet’s medium.  
If one maintains, as Hill does, that speech is an ethical act, then the poet’s “rectitude of 
judgement” must exercise itself upon that language in which virtue—or vice, for that 
matter—obtains.  This is the ethical valence of the emphasis on embodiment found in the 
two sections, from The Triumph of Love, examined in the previous chapter.  The 
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“atonement” or, in Sherry’s term, “aesthetic perfection” of the poem can only be 
achieved through the enactment of virtue in language.  
In practicing a poetics whose parts “are still heavy with history,” Hill avoids that 
cultural amnesia that considers language from the ever-new perspective of present 
circumstance: “The Word has been abroad, is back, with a suntanned look / From its 
subsistence in the stiffening-mire.”
95
  Hill’s flippancy of tone in the opening of 
“Annunciations 1” ironizes the casualness with which language is considered only under 
the auspices of its present usefulness.  If it does, in fact, have an historical indebtedness, 
that depth is considered here as a limbo of “stiffening-mire.”  As obscure as the location 
of “abroad,” whence language comes to hand eloquently (“suntanned look”) from beyond 
the sphere of public obligation, “stiffening-mire” recalls both the threat of inertia posed 
by language’s indebtedness and the threat of cultural amnesia in which history becomes a 
homogenous mass of indistinct occurrences.  With “stiffening-mire,” Hill evokes 
history’s solidification so that it is no longer a vital resource for the present.  
Alternatively, “mire” suggests the ethical quagmire that presents itself to the poet who 
takes the consideration of history as his negotium.  In such a disposition towards 
language, “Cleansing has become killing, the reward / Touchable, overt, clean to the 
touch.”  “Cleansing has become killing” addresses both the present circumstance of 
euphemistic atrocity (“ethnic cleansing”) and the special pleading that, far from ensuring 
freedom from obligation, cleansing the language in fact kills our ethical grounding.  In 
this context the distinction from Sherry is important.  At such “a distance from the steam 
of beasts, / the loathy neckings and the fat shook spawn,” that is from the viciousness of 
physical reality, the “searchers with the curers sit at meat / And are satisfied.”  Removed 
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from “the matter of blood fact,” poetry becomes a gourmand’s exercise in self-
satisfaction.   When “such precious things” as the bloody facts of history are “put down,” 
easing the flesh “through turbulence,” the “soul / Purples itself.” Amongst the contexture 
of “steam of beasts,” “loathy neckings,” “fat shook spawn,” “eye squats” and “gobbets,” 
the image of the soul purpling itself takes on the corpulence and grotesqueness of an 
insufficient “negotium of language itself.”  Once we remove ourselves from the “matter 
of bloody fact” and accept an otiose freedom from our historically grounded civic 
obligations, we become unable to ethically engage in the public sphere of the res publica.  
Indeed the entire idiom of the poem depicts an “otiosity and vacuity” resultant from the 
subservience of language to a present circumstance in which “all who attend to harp or 
fiddle / For betterment, flavour their decent mouths / With gobbets of sweetest sacrifice.”   
However, Hill’s poetic practice parodies this otiose appropriation of language and, 
instead, works towards an enactment of the poet’s negotium in language.  We have 
already noted the way the “energy of judgement” in Hill’s idiom contradicts the otiosity 
and vacuity which it represents by the equivocation within “Cleansing has become 
killing.”  Additionally, Hill’s capitalization of “Word,” which cannot help but recall the 
biblical logos and the power of language to create, juxtaposes the depiction of art in the 
service of present pleasure with the poet’s awareness of the obligations of an art 
committed to rigorous engagement with tradition.  These subtle “heftings” and “tunings” 
of language are antithetical to that otiosity which they depict.  The negotium here, of 
deference towards and attention to language’s alterity, is the enactment of the 
concurrence between the poetic self and the not-self of language.  The atonement obtains 
in the difference between Hill’s negotium of language and the otiose appropriation of 
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language that the poem depicts.  Instead of a responsible engagement with language, 
poetry in the sole service of present circumstance may become merely “gobbets of 
sweetest sacrifice” to appease “the (supposed) patron.” In modernizing the genre of the 
patron poem, Hill, in “To the (Supposed) Patron,” inculpates himself in the genre’s 
historical temptation.  The parenthesis of the title both ironizes the patron that the poem 
depicts: one who supposes himself to be a patron of the arts; and projects a desired patron 
who would secure the otium necessary for the poet to create: 
Prodigal of loves and barbecues, 
Expert in the strangest faunas, at home 
He considers the lilies, the rewards. 
There is no substitute for a rich man. 
At his first entering a new province 
With new coin, music, the barest glancing 
Of steel or gold suffices.  There are many  
Tremulous dreams secured under that head. 
For his delight and his capacity 
To absorb, freshly, the inside-succulence 
Of untoughened sacrifice, his bronze agents 
Speculate among the convertible stones 
And drink desert sand.  That no mirage 
Irritate his mild gaze, the lewd noonday 
Is housed in cool places, and fountains 
Salt the sparse haze.  His flesh is made clean. 
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For the unfallen—the firstborn, or wise 
Councillor—prepared vistas extend 
As far as harvest; and idyllic death 
Where fish at dawn ignite the powdery lake.
96
  
In examining the difficulty that the poem addresses, we might note the distance between 
Hill’s “consider” in “Merlin” (“I will consider the outnumbering dead”) and the patron’s 
consideration, “He considers the lilies, the rewards.”  In “Merlin,” “consider” announces 
a manner of engagement with the subject of the poem.  The consideration, here, enacts a 
much different engagement.
97
 Hill’s “lilies” alludes, obliquely, to the discourse on otium 
and negotium in the Sermon on the Mount.  In Matthew V, Jesus complicates the dictums 
of the Ten Commandments into a rigorous moral negotium: “Ye have heard that it was 
said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger 
of the judgement: But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without 
cause shall be in danger of the judgement: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, 
shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger 
of hell fire.”
98
  Jesus proceeds, in verses 23-48, to similarly complicate other foundational 
Old Testament ethical principles.  In these verses, Christian ethics is transformed from 
the adherence to ethical dictates into a rigorous process of interpretation between the self 
and the world. The idea of Christian practice changes from an adherence to proscriptive 
dictates into a holistic, dispositional way of being in the world.   It is in the context of this 
renewed ethical rigor that Jesus asks the crowd to consider the lilies: 
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And why take ye thought for raiment?  Consider the lilies of the field, how 
they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto you, that 
even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.  
Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to day is, and to 
morrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of 
little faith?
99
 
Christ points out that the otium granted by God’s providence only comes as a 
result of the negotium of Christian practice.  One must first seek “the kingdom of God, 
and his righteousness” before “all these things shall be added unto you.”
100
  Part of that 
seeking consists in humbling the self in the manner of the Beatitudes.  This tension 
between the negotium of humbling oneself in the world and worldly otium animates the 
poetic practice of “To the (Supposed) Patron.”  Hill, himself, notes the presence of this 
tension as an inherent fact in the role of the public poet.  In “Poetry as ‘Menace’ and 
‘Atonement’,” Hill observes that “the acceptance of a principle of penitential humility in 
the conduct of life does not necessarily inhibit a readiness to accept the status of 
‘maestro’ conferred by a supportive yet coercive public.”
101
  The genre of the patron 
poem has historically had to negotiate between the poet’s ethical “conduct of life” and a 
“supportive yet coercive public.”  The temptation to compromise the ethical self in order 
to praise the patron and secure financial solvency (and, at times, political security) is 
inherent in the genre.   
Yet the zeugma in the opening line that conjoins “loves” and “barbecues” 
immediately calls into question this (supposed) patron’s ethical valuations.  The 
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conjunction fails to acknowledge the inherent difference of value between the importance 
of loves and the importance of barbecues.  Nevertheless, Hill does conjoin them, 
depicting the patron as prodigal of both.  Initially this may appear as an instance of Hill 
compromising his ethics and pandering to the patron.  Only when we recognize the poetic 
tradition of the zeugma as an ironizing device in Neo-Classical poetry and hear the 
echoes of the Parable of the Prodigal Son do we understand the poet’s negotium of 
language being enacted.  In considering the “lilies, the rewards,” the patron misses the 
ethical emphasis on negotium in the Sermon on the Mount.  “At home,” that is removed 
from the public sphere of civic obligation, the patron enjoys an otiosity not gained 
through ethical labor.  Yet, insofar as the poem is an accomplished patron poem, Hill 
acknowledges the temptation to write otiose poems in praise of such a patron.  The two 
laudatory epigraphs (“there is no substitute for a rich man” and “his flesh is made clean”) 
and the sublime concluding images that seem offered as a supplicant’s gift (“prepared 
vistas extend / As far as harvest; and idyllic death / Where fish at dawn ignite the 
powdery lake”) show Hill’s capabilities in this genre.  These structures implicate Hill in 
the desire to secure his leisure through patronage, even at the expense of his ethical 
obligations.  However, Hill’s poetic practice resists this temptation, insisting instead upon 
the ethical importance of toughened sacrifice. 
At least some of the “rewards” for the supposed patron are the loves and 
barbecues, as well as the art presumably, which his affluence affords him the leisure and 
means to enjoy.  Further, Hill suggests, such affluence lends influence so that “at his first 
entering a new province / With new coin… the barest glancing / Of steel or gold suffices” 
to lend him authority.  The “music” of his wealth tunes the art with which he surrounds 
 
74 
himself.  This is the temptation to an ethically compromised aesthetic that Hill’s images 
provocatively acknowledge.  It is because of the patron’s influence and affluence that 
“there are many / Tremulous dreams secured under that head”; yet the patron remains 
unconcerned (“barest glancing”) with the negotium of the poet’s task (“tremulous”).  
Here “head” both synecdochally denotes the person of the patron and metonymically 
denotes the head of that “new coin,” which he introduces into the artistic economy. The 
“bronze agents” panderer to the patron’s acquisitiveness, much as Hill seems to pander to 
the patron’s vanity his sycophantic epigrams: “there is no substitute for a rich man” and 
“his flesh is made clean.” The bronze agents merely “speculate” amongst art that is both 
economically tradable (“convertible stones”) and lifeless (“desert sand”).  The emphasis 
here is upon art’s economic and cultural value, its status as a commodity.  In order to 
cater to the supposed patron’s “delight and his capacity / To absorb, freshly, the inside-
succulence / Of untoughened sacrifice,” these agents appropriate art for the patron.  As is 
appropriate to one “prodigal of loves and barbecues,” the “lewd noonday / Is housed in 
cool places, and fountains / Salt the sparse haze” to maintain the patron’s otium and 
ensure “that no mirage / Irritate his mild gaze.”  The patron remains beyond the sphere of 
public obligation and sacrifices.  “For the Unfallen,” those like the patron, who 
appropriate art for pleasure while remaining ignorant of the contexture of its making, 
“prepared vistas extend / As far as harvest; and idyllic death / Where fish at dawn ignite 
the powdery lake.”  The vistas extend as far as harvest because, at harvest, negotium 
begins.  As with the “lilies,” the harvest as boundary reinforces the patron’s leisure.  
Similarly, “prepared” reinforces the artificial and self-serving function of art as the patron 
understands it. For this art, and indeed the otiose circumstance of the patron generally, 
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foreshadows an “idyllic death” in the pastoral landscape of the lake at dawn.  In the 
depiction of the patron, art is understood as part of, and contributing to, an unearned 
otium.  Further, this commodification of art has the pernicious effect of creating a 
demand for “untoughened sacrifice,” otiose art. 
However, even if we were unaware of Hill’s critical caveats about the otiosity of 
poetry and making artistic judgments into “gobbets of sweetest sacrifice,” Hill’s working 
of language within the poem itself would alert us to the threat posed by a system of 
patronage whose evaluative criteria ignores the ethical in favor of the aesthetic.  As Hill 
insists, the perfection of the poem is the enactment of ethics in its aesthetic techniques. 
Only then does the poetry enact the ideal embodiment of ethics in action.  The idiom 
alone is enough to constitute a critique.  The unobtrusively equivocating conjunction of 
“loves and barbecues”; the flaccid reiteration of “new” in “new province” and “new coin”; 
the corporality of the labial [b] in “absorb”; the lisping alliteration in “inside-succulence” 
and “sacrifice”; the biting [z] that ironically connects “dreams” with “bronze,” “gaze,” 
“haze,” and “wise”; the weak vowels of “untoughened”; the vacuity of “speculations” 
(one might recall, for contrast, the precision of Hill’s “nice speculation”); the impossible 
paradox of “convertible stones”; and the violence of the final image in which “fish at 
dawn ignite the powdery lake” all undermine the sycophantic idealization of the 
beneficent patron.  Once we are aware of Hill’s subtle negotium of language, we are 
simultaneously made aware that this poetic practice enacts an art antithetical to that 
valued by the patron.  The patron values the “inside-succulence” of “untoughened 
sacrifice”: an art that is aesthetically pleasing (even pandering at times) and that neither 
embodies the poet’s negotium in its practices nor requires negotium on the reader’s part.  
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“Inside-succulence” looks back to “at home,” and conforms to the patron’s and the 
poem’s removal from the ethical obligations of the public sphere.  Similarly, 
“untoughened sacrifice” ignores the negotium that is a poetry that embodies its 
fulfillment of civic obligations.  While both layers of Hill’s poem, the overt depiction of 
the patron and the covert critique, have their “inside-succulence,” the covert critique 
enacts the toughened sacrifice of a poet’s struggle with the medium of language.  
Although Hill acknowledges his own temptation to abdicate the ethical rigors of civically 
responsible poetry, his language works with an antithetical diligence and rigor to depict 
the otiosity and vacuity of that art that delights the patron.   
The toughened nature of this sacrifice is made all the more apparent as Hill tunes 
in biblical and classical allusions, rather than evacuating the language of its historical 
weight and making it into “convertible stones” and “desert sand” in the service of 
aesthetic enjoyment.  In a historical context, the desert imagery and “expert in the 
strangest faunas” evoke British colonialism and the birth of amateur anthropology and 
archeology.  The British empire (though not only the British empire) appropriated the art 
of conquered cultures as novelties and symbols of cultural superiority much like the 
patron appropriates art for his own benefit.   Hill tunes “prodigal” so that, even as we 
understand the patron’s affluence, we hear the Parable of the Prodigal Son’s squandering 
of gifts and fortunes.  Although greatly gifted, we are given to understand, the patron 
squanders that “new coin” on “untoughened sacrifice,” facile art.  Similarly, Hill brings a 
litany of Christ (“firstborn, or wise / Councillor”) to bear, ironically, within his litany of 
the supposed patron and rewords the classical epigram, “there is not substitute for a just 
man,” into the sycophantic “there is no substitute for a rich man” in such ways that the 
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disjunctions maintain the pressure of Hill’s critique.  These textural critiques, however, 
move beyond the immediate effect of parody.  It is within the play between overt 
representation and covert critique that Hill enacts a poetic practice antithetical to that art 
of “untoughened sacrifice” appropriated by the patron.  The poem, then, may be 
understood as having (at least) three levels: the overt depiction of the patron; the covert 
satire; and the enactment of a virtuous poetic practice.  At this last level, Hill enacts a 
scrupulous poetic practice through the reticent judgement of his idiom, the density of his 
images, and responsible deployment of both.  His rigor with language, which is the rigor 
of self-examination, stands in distinctive contrast to that art which panders to the patron’s 
otium.  Instead, Hill’s enactment offers an art of ascetic rewards, of ethical action 
embodied in language.  
Yet if the dead, history, and tradition are the subjects of consideration, as they are 
in “Merlin,” or the means of enacting an ethical resistance to a poetry of present pleasure, 
as they are in “To the (Supposed) Patron” and “Annunciations 1,” they, themselves, may 
also become the object of appropriation.  As Hill guardedly announces in “September 
Song,” “(I have made / an elegy for myself it / is true),” the impulse to glorify the dead 
and appropriate history in the service of present circumstance must also be guarded 
against with scrupulosity.  For, as Hill phrases it in “A Pastoral,” we might too readily 
“cleanse with a kind of artistry the ground / Shared by war” in order to “celebrate, 
fluently and at ease.”
102
  This is the more vicious aspect of that cultural amnesia that Hill 
considers in “Merlin.”  Rather than being forgotten, the dead are memorialized; “statues” 
are “darkened by laurel” and tradition and historical violence become, instead, 
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“evergreen names,” “evidently-veiled griefs,” and “impervious tombs.”
103
  The impetus 
to memorialize the dead and edify the present through their example ignores the 
obligation to responsibly take into account the dynamic between special pleading and the 
circumstantial facts. However, to consider the dead in poetry is inevitably an 
appropriation of sorts.  The dead are, to some degree or another, removed from the knotty 
complex of their “special pleading and the circumstantial facts” and appropriated into the 
contexture of language that is the poem.   
Such is the predicament that Hill address in “History as Poetry.”  As in “To the 
(Supposed) Patron,” Hill atones for this predicament through his poetic practice.  His 
scrupulosity with language mediates a consideration of the dynamic between inevitable 
appropriation and rectitude of judgement: 
Poetry as salutation; taste 
Of Pentecost’s ashen feast.  Blue wounds. 
The tongue’s atrocities.  Poetry  
Unearths from among the speechless dead 
 
Lazarus mystified, common man  
Of death.  The lily rears its gouged face 
From the provided loam.  Fortunate 
Auguries; whirrings; tarred golden dung: 
 
‘A resurgence’ as they say.  The old 
Laurels wagging with the new: Selah! 
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Thus laudable the trodden bone thus 
unanswerable the knack of tongues.
104
 
As we have seen, Hill understands the poet’s engagement with language as an attempt to 
reach concurrence between the self and the not-self.  In this sense, poetry offers a 
“salutation” to the tradition whence it proceeds.  Here the poet considers the not-self that 
is tradition through the figure of the dead.  “Salutation” implies a welcome and lauding.  
Yet the danger, addressed also in “To the (Supposed) Patron,” is that otiose poetry might 
pander to its subject; and poetry, too often, welcomes the dead by hyperbolically lauding 
them.  In this way, the gift of tongues bestowed upon the apostles at Pentecost becomes 
an “ashen feast.”  When used irresponsibly, when language is not worked into a 
concurrence between the self and the not-self that is the basis of communication and 
community, the poet fails to take up the charismatic strength of language offered at 
Pentecost.  For too unscrupulous a welcoming of the dead, of history, within poetry does 
not yield the revelatory pronouncements of the gospels, but rather an ashen and servile 
rehearsal of the dead.  Such a rehearsal, which is a merely reiterative poetry, stands in 
contrast to Donne’s rehearsal of the dead in order to ascertain “what must presently be 
said and done,” which we examined in the previous chapter.  In the context of “History as 
Poetry,” the emphasis is changed from a concern with the influence of tradition to a 
concern with the responsible representation of traditional concerns.  The emphasis 
changes from the poem’s subject to the manner of the poem’s enactment.  Lax 
appropriations of tradition are “blue wounds.”  The figure here calls up the wounds on 
corpses, suggesting both reiteration of previous “tongue’s atrocities” and fresh atrocities 
being perpetrated on the dead as they are rehearsed in the service of present circumstance.  
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“Lazarus mystified, common man / Of death” points towards the fetid exhumation that a 
poetry that “unearths from among the speechless dead” enacts.  The sort of historical 
poetry Hill considers here is a morbid version of those “convertible stones” and “desert 
sand” from “To the (Supposed) Patron.”  This reiterative poetry merely exhumes the dead 
in order to appropriate them.  Just as the “soul / Purples itself” in the otiosity afforded by 
a historically evacuated language, here the dead are synecdochally reduced to “blue 
wounds,” a vapidly self-serving melancholia.  Yet such poems are accorded the status of 
miracles in their reanimations of “Lazarus mystified,” as though the poet himself had 
been blessed with the Pentecostal charisma.  Thus the diminution of historical violence 
into the “lily” is understood as a violated object that “rears its gouged face / From the 
provided loam.”  Here “gouged,” again, recalls those “blue wounds” and reinforces the 
poem’s status as, metaphorically, an exhumed corpse.  Similarly, “provided” implies that 
the loam, the substratum of history whence the poet unearths his reiterative 
appropriations, stands in the service of present circumstances as the material of which the 
poet makes use.  Thus these poems become prognostications, “Fortunate / Auguries; 
whirrings; tarred golden dung,” because they treat the past, the dead, solely in relation to 
the present.  In that final image “tarred golden dung,” the dead have become the fecal 
mater in which the poet reads the present’s future.  From such a perspective, the present 
will always be “‘a resurgence’ as they say” because the present poem is merely a 
reiteration of the dead corpse of history.  “The old / Laurels wagging with the new” (not 
unlike the tail wagging the dog) reinforces the mutually reaffirming relationship Hill here 
depicts between history and reiterative poetry.  The “salutation” between poetry and the 
dead with which the poem opens is not a concurrence between the self and the not-self; 
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rather, it is a greeting between the self in the present and the self that has been read into 
the exhumed corpse of history.  In the very act of praising (“laudable”) the dead, the dead 
become the “trodden bone” of poetry, exhumed in the sole service of present 
circumstance.  The “knack of tongues” stands, like the ashen feast that Pentecost has 
become, in opposition to a vital negotium of language.  The dark pun on “unanswerable” 
contains the substance of the poet’s predicament.  Reiterative poetry asserts that it is not 
answerable for the historical atrocity which it appropriates.  This self-exculpation 
authorizes the colonization of history by the present.  A civically obligated poetry, 
however, asserts the essential irrefutability of historical violence as a condition embedded 
in the medium of the poet’s craft.  This, Hill suggests, is the tension and ethical dilemma 
posed in the writing of commemorative verse. 
Yet as with “To the (Supposed) Patron,” Hill moves beyond the mere diagnosis of 
a predicament by enacting his atonement in the contexture of the poem.  In contrast with 
its depiction of a poetry that places the dead in the service of the present, Hill’s poetic 
practice is alive to the fact that language is “intimately one’s own and not one’s own.”  
Hill frames his poem with “salutation” and “laudable,” both indebted to Latin greetings 
(salutare and laudare respectively), and where the poem merely speaks of greeting, Hill’s 
precision here finds concurrence between the self and the not-self in the genuinely 
fortunate indebtedness of language.  In practice this is distinct from either the prophetic 
claim of tasting “Pentecost’s ashen feast” or the more mundane claim to a “knack of 
tongues.”  Hill’s deployment of these words recognizes contemporary usage while 
depending on both historical depth and on the reader’s recognition of that indebtedness, 
just as “ashen” tunes in its own incongruity to the Pentecostal gift by noting the absence 
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of a vital fire in this “knack of tongues.”  Similarly, “mystified” comically and 
sympathetically imagines Lazarus’s unutterable gratitude in contrast with a poetics that 
considers the dead “speechless.”  Hill’s self within the poem comes to a concurrence with 
the not-self that is tradition’s historical weight through a poetic practice that gratefully 
acknowledges the gifts of the dead who are not speechless.  Recognizing this dynamic, 
the concluding lines unleash the multivocality of the context of the surface critique where 
the emphasis falls upon “laudable,” “trodden bone,” “unanswerable,” and “knack of 
tongues.”  This weighting of noun and adjective is consistent with a reiterative poetic 
practice that considers the dead as objects to be acted upon.  However, the contexture of 
the poem places the emphasis differently upon the ironically reiterative “thus…thus” of 
the second-to-last line, mocking a servile reiteration.  In generating a semantic tension 
between content and form, the structure here calls due attention to the importance of 
poetic practice, reinforcing Hill’s emphasis on enactment.  Historical poetry responsibly 
responds to and the lauds the dead when it tunes in the historical indebtedness of 
language. This maintains the autonomy of the dead as not-self.  Here, again, it is Hill’s 
“scrupulosity” with language that characterizes the nature of his labor.  Indeed this 
emphasis on poetry as an ethical act remains a persistent element in Hill’s poetry.  While 
frequently Hill’s language seems to equivocate into indeterminacy, his scrupulosity with 
language enacts determinate judgments by forcing the reader back into history rather than 
lifting him out of it.  It is this poetic practice of “virtue… called forth to action in the 
negotium of language itself” that comprises the self’s investiture in the poem.    
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CHAPTER III: “A MODE OF MORAL LIFE” 
In its insistence upon considering tradition in light of present circumstance and 
upon the poet’s ethical investiture in that consideration, Hill’s poetry strains against the 
tenor of what John B. Vickery describes as the “modern elegiac temper”: “in the very act 
of acceptance there still sounds the note of received sorrow.  It functions as the ground-
base of the elegiac uttered in the primary and essential isolation of the human condition….  
Such a topos brings the elegiac impulse full circle by recapturing in a manner both self-
aware and self-critical its recapitulation of the late medieval ‘ubi sunt,’ Spenser’s 
haunting phrase ‘the ruins of time,’ and the Vergilian ‘lacrimae rerum’.”
105
  Hill’s 
commemorative poetry recalls and projects the conventional topoi as a response to “the 
primary and essential isolation of the human condition” in modernity. Hill’s engagement 
with tradition maintains its essential alterity rather than enacting a servile rehearsal.  
Vickery rightly depicts the elegy as historically retrospective.  Even Vickery’s 
description participates in the nostalgic sentimentality of the consolatory elegy in its 
lovingly tolling out those traditional motifs from the “primary and essential isolation” of 
the critic’s condition.  Vickery understands this mournfulness as essential to the modern 
poet’s condition where Hill depicts, rather, the potentiality “that his selfhood may be 
made at-one with itself” and that the poet may “learn to live in his affliction… with the 
renewed sense of a vocation.”
106
  The difference between Hill’s engagement with the 
dead and Vickery’s obtains in Hill’s refusal to seek or offer consolation.  Hill, rather, 
mourns that modern “human condition” that has detached us from the dead and 
enraptured us in an eternal present.  His engagement with the literary tradition is a direct 
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response to this situation. 
For this reason, Hill’s poems also do not fit Peter Sacks’s more conventional 
understanding of the elegy as enacting a psychological process by which the speaker 
relinquishes libidinous attachment to the lost object (the dead) and arrives at consolation 
from grief through a reattachment of the libido to the substitute object (the poem, natural 
cycles, spiritual transmutation, etc.).  Within the framework of “healthy mourning,” 
Sacks notes “the extreme toughness of Hill’s elegiac stance… a refusal to console 
without first stressing decimation and the bleak harshness of judgement—a harshness as 
intransigent as rock, however daubed.”
107
  Such judgement, according to Sacks, 
constituted the consolation of Hill’s elegies: 
 [Hill’s] elegies are sacrificial and expiatory in the extreme.  By 
recognizing not only the connection between the horror of contemporary 
violence and the violence of ancient theology but also the necessity of 
extreme chastisement for the gain of any solace, he has written some of 
the few consoling poems of our time.
108
 
Sacks narrowly misses Hill’s emphasis on refusing consolation (“a refusal to console” 
comes close, but then “without first stressing…”). The ethical responsibility of the poet, 
as we have seen, is to bear “his peculiar unnecessary shame in a world growing ever 
more shameless”
109
 and to tune language so that the “shock of semantic recognition” 
becomes also “the shock of ethical recognition.”
110
  Hill’s considerations of the dead and 
his scrupulosity with language do not aim to console the reader any more than they 
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attempt to console the poet by transfiguring the dead.  Rather, Hill’s poetic practice 
guards against this “altruistic responsibility” by maintaining the distance between the 
circumstance of the poem and the dead’s priority.  Even one of Hill’s most overtly 
elegiac poems, “Two Formal Elegies 2,” refuses to console and rather seeks in the present 
an “acknowledgement / of what is owed the dead”: 
Is it good to remind them, on a brief screen, 
Of what they have witnessed and not seen? 
(Deaths of the city that persistently dies…?) 
To put up stones ensures some sacrifice. 
Sufficient men confer, carry their weight. 
(At whose door does the sacrifice stand or start?) 
Hill calls the efficacy of the conventional elegy into question, not as lacking the ability to 
console, but rather as lacking the ability to shock the audience into an ethical recognition 
of “what they have witnessed and not seen.”  The “brief screen” of artistic representation 
can only reiterate the “Deaths of the city that persistently dies.” This sort of repetitive 
elegy, like that considered in “History as Poetry,” obfuscates the reality of historical 
atrocity by merely recasting it.  Certainly “to put up stones ensures some sacrifice”; 
however, “sufficient men confer, carry their weight” suggests that the sacrifice is more in 
the service of erecting those memorials and monuments than in acknowledging the dead.  
In this context, the guarded final line serves as an indictment of modernity’s abdication of 
responsibility and an expression of that abrogation.  Hill neither seeks nor offers solace in 
these lines, but rather diagnoses the very problem with poetry’s—or any other art’s—
standing in place of the dead. 
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However, this refusal to console should not be read as a movement to the opposite 
extreme of Jahan Ramazani’s reading, which, working like Sacks from Freud’s 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” revises Sack’s model of the elegy into a “work of 
melancholy.”  Ramazani proposes “the psychology of mourning or melancholic 
mourning” as an alternative to Sacks’s consolatory or “healthy mourning.”
111
  In this 
formulation, rather than enacting the “conciliatory paradigm” that Sacks charts from 
Spenser to Yeats, “the modern elegist tends not to achieve but to resist consolation, not to 
override but to sustain anger, not to heal but to reopen wounds of loss.”
112
  In contrast to 
Sacks’s reading, for Ramazani, Hill’s poems “mark an extreme in the economic 
misgivings of the modern elegy”; Hill “is vigilant in preventing his rhetoric from drifting 
towards the redemptive.”
113
  Thus, “for Hill… every elegy is an elegy for elegy—a poem 
that mourns the diminished efficacy and legitimacy of poetic mourning.  But modern 
elegists… collectively redeem their mounting losses as aesthetic gains for the genre of 
the elegy.”
114
  Ramazani’s argument presents (at least) two difficulties with regard to 
Hill’s work.  First, as Ramazani admits, the redemption of “mounting losses as aesthetic 
gains for the genre of the elegy” is a “recuperative line of argument which shifts the 
rhetoric of redemption from particular elegies to a historical narrative about elegies.”
115
  
While this is a subtle move in theory, it does little more than reiterate Sacks’s argument 
that “the issues of justice and of judgement become prominent precisely when the 
inherited fictions and modes of consolation have grown weakest”—a line of development 
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that Sacks traces from “Lycidas” forward.
116
  For both critics, the poem becomes an 
object of consolation in substitution for the lost object.  As we have already seen in our 
consideration of Sacks’s claims, Hill’s poems do not attempt to replace the dead with the 
aesthetic object of the poem, and more frequently, they point out the irresponsibility of 
doing so.
117
  Instead Hill’s poems attempt to reconnect the present with the priority of the 
dead through the texture of their engagement with tradition. 
The second difficulty is Ramazani’s notion of the elegy as “an elegy for elegy,” 
and his recapitulation of the post-modern conceit of existing in a post-lapsarian state of 
language.  The notion that the modern elegy is a “poem that mourns the diminished 
efficacy and legitimacy of poetic mourning” presupposes a pre-lapsarian moment of the 
“efficacy and legitimacy of poetic mourning.”  Yet Hill does not distinguish the poet’s 
resistance to the coercions of public demand and historical indebtedness as a particularly 
post-modern predicament—although it seems reasonable to assume that Hill would agree 
that poetry garners less public attention at present.  Instead, Hill finds that writers as 
historically diverse as “Dryden and Pound are indeed comparable in their awareness of 
the political and economic realities of circumstance, of the ways in which the writer’s 
judgement of word-values both affects and is affected by his understanding of, or his 
failure to comprehend, the current reckonings of his day.”
118
  Hill does not “mourn the 
diminished efficacy and legitimacy of poetic mourning,” but diagnoses its pandering to 
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“the current reckonings of value” in the society of his day. By turning the “mounting 
losses” of historical violence into the “aesthetic gains” of merely altruistically responsible 
poetry, poets in the genre risk appropriating historical violence for acclaim.  The failure 
lies in the disconnectedness of the elegist rather than in the form of the elegy as a genre.  
In response, Hill’s poems do not mourn this state of poetry, but rather enact a poetic 
practice that is grounded in tradition and that resists appropriation through formal 
difficulty. 
More broadly, the problem with Vickery’s, Sacks’s, and Ramazani’s models in 
regard to Hill’s poetic practice is their emphasis on consolation.  Hill’s poems are neither 
nostalgically retrospective, nor do they seek to console.  Hill’s poetry concerns the 
present and seeks a way of reconnecting the present with tradition by “going over what 
has many times been said and done” in order to ascertain “what must presently be said 
and done.”
119
  For this reason, Robert Pogue Harrison’s genetic, historical thesis offers a 
better model for examining the predicament of the Hill’s commemorative poetry.   
Working in the mixed mode of Vico’s The New Science, Harrison deploys 
anthropological, philosophical, and philological analyses to develop his assertion that 
“being-towards-death,” Heidegger’s phrase, is, first and foremost, “being-towards-the-
dead.”
120
  In Harrison’s model, we are first made aware of our finitude, our indebtedness, 
and our potentiality by the physical presence of the corpse: 
For all its grave stillness there is nothing more dynamic than a corpse.  It 
is the event of passage taking place before our eyes.  This phenomenon of 
passage—from which devolves our abstract idea of the past—makes of the 
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unalive body a relational “thing” which, in its subjection to the power of 
death, binds past, present, and future.  The past (the no-longer-hereness of 
the person), the present (the corpse in its presence at-hand), and the future 
(the fate awaiting those who follow in the footsteps of the deceased) all 
converge in the dead body, as long, that is, as it remains an object of 
concern or solicitude for the living.
121
 
It is in the presence of the corpse, then, that we recognize our own historicity.  The body 
of the absent person reminds us that we are engendered by the past, that we exist in a 
moment of finitude, and that, in the moment of our finitude, we are obligated to the future 
we engender.  That obligation derives from, reflexively, the recognition of our own 
engendering in the presence of the corpse.  In the presence of that which engendered us, 
in the awareness of our own indebtedness to the corpse before us, we are made aware of 
the obligation, which we share with the dead, to ourselves engender the future.  As 
Harrison explains, the “authority of the dead and the charisma of the ancestors” derive 
from their “passing from the realm of the engendered into that of engendering.”
122
  By 
this transition, “the dead become the authors and proprietors of life, personifying all that 
transcends and yet at the same time generates human society.”
123
  Because of the 
authority of the dead, present existence falls under the condition of “guilt,” in the 
Heideggerian sense of a debt or obligation.  The experience of “guilt,” which is “the debt 
I owe my future,” stems from the “call of conscience… that issues forth from… finitude, 
calling Dasein back to its primordial guilt.”
124
  That “primordial guilt” is our 
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indebtedness to the dead insofar as we, the living, are the inheritors of their rituals, 
traditions, and ideologies. 
It is because of this “tenacious, subterranean authority” of the dead that our own 
“freedom is linked so intimately with authenticity.”
125
  This authenticity is the complex 
dynamic by which the legacy of the dead is taken up by the present.  As such, it “consists 
neither in blind rebellion against, nor in slavish submission to, the dead’s authority.”
126
  
Authenticity, rather, is an “authentic retrieval” of the possibilities engendered by the past 
through our inheritance of their rituals, institutions, and ideologies.  “The problem with 
inauthentic retrieval,” Harrison explains, “is that it almost always means allowing the 
dead to choose our inherited possibilities for us.”
127
  Inauthentic retrieval does not 
recognize the fundamental differences between the historical context of the past and the 
context of the present.  Alternatively, inauthentic retrieval can ignore the historical 
continuities between the past and present, and thus, can ignore the resources that the past 
offers to the present.  Authentic retrieval, instead, finds the resources for the present and 
future in the inherited rituals, institutions, and ideologies of the past. 
It is in light of the cultural centrality of the dead that Harrison argues for the 
centrality of funerary and mourning rituals in our understanding of our mortality.  Funeral 
laments, rituals, and elegies encode this “being-toward-the-dead” in culturally specific 
modes.  Yet in Harrison’s thesis the psychological work of consolation that these 
traditions enable is secondarily important to the socializing work that they perform.  It is 
by socializing and objectifying grief that mourning practices enable consolation.  
Consolation is achieved by bringing the mourner back into the public sphere of the living.  
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By doing so, the ritual generates the lineament between the past, present, and future.  It is 
the process by which these institutions adopt the dead into culture and return the bereaved 
to their obligations in the present and future that constitute the value of these practices.  
The articulation of grief in and through culturally prescribed modes, Harrison argues, 
connects past, present, and future in the institution of the lament: 
The obligation conveyed by grief is that of self-mortalization.  To 
mortalize oneself means to learn how to live as a dying creature, or better, 
to learn how to make of one’s mortality the foundation of one’s relations 
to those who live on, no less than to those who have passed away.  To 
cope with one’s mortality means to recognize its kinship with others and 
to turn this kinship in death into a shared language…. Through grief I 
learn to speak my death to the world… and to understand that whoever has 
the capacity of speak is, like me, a creature for whom dying is first and 
second nature.  Where this pedagogy fails, language inevitably works 
against us, grief remains locked in aphasia, and the work of objectification 
miscarries.
128
 
The inability to enact “healthy mourning,” which Ramazani describes as the 
unique characteristic of the contemporary elegy, is thus as much a problem of institutions 
and rituals as it is of psychology.  Without vital cultural practices by which to objectify 
our grief and create continuity in our intimate experience of human historicity, we remain 
“locked in aphasia,” unable to access the potentialities offered by our historical 
inheritance.  In its ability to transmute the natural occurrence of death into cultural value, 
the ritual of mourning is the initial site at which historical continuity is created, and 
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through which the resources of tradition can be accessed.  However, as Harrison reminds 
us, these very institutions are “historical, hence they too succumb to the law of passing.  
If new ones do not take their place, the transformation into value does not happen, 
precisely because we are at a loss when it comes to knowing how to mourn.”
129
  The 
failure of the elegy in modernity can be read, in light of Harrison’s thesis, as a failure of 
the present to maintain a connection with the dead through an authentic retrieval of their 
rituals and ideologies.  This inability can result either from a perceived irrelevance in the 
rituals themselves or, as is more often the case, an incongruity between ritual consolation 
and the loss it must objectify.  In either case, however, this inability to mourn the dead 
and transmit their passing into cultural value undermines the foundation of society.  In 
being unable to find adequate modes of “being-towards-the-dead,” the living cannot 
authentically retrieve the legacy of their own “guilt.” 
In poetry, the principle cultural mode of “being-towards-the-dead” is the elegy.  
The continuity in the genre, which Sacks and Ramazani describe, authorizes the elegy’s 
claim as a cultural institution.  The historical evolution that these scholars trace is the 
repeated authentic retrieval of the institution of the elegy.  The continuity that exists 
between historically disparate elegies is evidence that these poets have all engaged with 
the dead in the mode of primordial guilt.  Such continuity is the foundation of tradition.  
However, these scholars also note the evolution of certain tropes, images, and modes of 
consolation.  These evolutions mark the authenticity of the tradition.  Prior modes are not 
simply recalled and redeployed; they are reconsidered.  The new poem inherits the 
possibilities that tradition offers.  Insofar as Hill’s primary mode is a consideration of 
history and tradition, his poems should be considered as enacting an authentic retrieval 
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under the condition of primordial guilt.  In returning himself and us to historical atrocities, 
Hill’s poetry seeks to authentically retrieve the inherited possibilities of the dead.  Hill’s 
consideration of tradition and history maintains their alterity.  In “Merlin,” as we have 
seen, this takes the form of the meter acknowledging the ritual of the heroic couplet and 
deviating from it.  In sections VI and IX from The Triumph of Love, Hill engages with 
Romantic and Metaphysical modes in order to distinguish his own understanding of 
“apprehension.”  The difficult historical and literary complexes embodied in the “lilies,” 
from “To the (Supposed) Patron,” order the energy of judgement in the poem.  These are 
instances of Hill’s technique as an authentic retrieval.  Tradition and history are not 
ignored in these instances, but neither are they imitated.  Rather, Hill finds these 
historical resources embedded in the texture of language.  The present utterance of the 
poem thus evolves from an awareness of its own indebtedness. 
Hill’s elegy, “September Song”, returns us to the primordial encounter with the 
grave.  In its epitaphic epigraph we encounter our own indebtedness to historical atrocity. 
born 19.6.32-deported 24.9.42 
 
Undesirable you may have been, untouchable 
you were not.  Not forgotten 
or passed over at the proper time. 
 
As estimated, you died.  Things marched, 
sufficient, to that end. 
Just so much Zyklon and leather, patented 
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terror, so many routine cries. 
 
(I have made 
an elegy for myself it 
it true) 
 
September fattens on vines.  Roses 
flake from the wall.  The smoke 
of harmless fires drifts to my eyes. 
 
This is plenty.  This is more than enough.
130
 
As we have seen, in Hill’s poetry to find oneself caught in the straights of a 
predicament is to have recourse to critique.  Such was the dynamic between the layers of 
language in “Annunciations 1,” “To the (Supposed) Patron,” and “History as Poetry.”  In 
these instances the irony—if one can call Hill’s responsible handling of language 
“ironic”—obtains in the disjunction between the language’s matter and its manner. In 
“September Song,” the irony rests touchingly, humanely, on an awareness that “quotidian 
language, both casual and curial, is itself highly charged, but charged with the enormous 
power of the contingent and circumstantial.”
131
  Hill creates a juxtaposition between the 
surface of the poem and the poem’s enactment by working quotidian language into an act 
of responsible witness of atrocious circumstance.  There is a “local vividness” in the 
awareness that both “undesirable” and “untouchable” might be undressed into a much 
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more intimate relation in their quotidian senses.  Yet this suggestion of the desire for and 
pleasure of human touch is tuned out by that least desirable of touches that leaves 
“undesirable” and “untouchable” untouching at the line’s end. Hill’s “untouchable” also 
bears in mind the caste of untouchables, and recalls the ways in which entire peoples are 
oppressed through ideology.  It serves as a reminder that, although the Holocaust was 
horrible in its extent and viciousness, it is not unique in its ideological foundations.  The 
human desire for contact asks us to elide the sense-making punctuation; however, this 
impetus makes the inhumanity of the event all the more senseless by rendering Hill’s 
syntax equally senseless: something like “undesirable you may have been, untouchable 
you were not not forgotten.”  In this sense, the reader colludes with the anonymity of the 
epitaphic epigraph by appropriating the act of memorization into a longing for human 
contact.  In juxtaposition, Hill’s punctuation forces attention to the particulars of syntax 
and mediates the progression of clauses, ensuring that words and lines are only “passed 
over at the proper time.”  In this enactment of the movement between the particular and 
the general, Hill’s technique draws attention to the black irony of this historical reversal 
of the salvific Passover.  The reader is restrained from passing over those victims who, 
unfortunately, were not passed over.  Hill’s scrupulous grammar atones for the coercion 
of quotidian language to appropriate loss by tuning attention back to the aesthetic 
particulars.  The syntax draws attention to the historical precedents of this unprecedented 
atrocity.  
Hill’s practice here has the tact to acknowledge that “we cannot regard motive as 
something which lies outside the contextual frame; it is through ‘the process, ordre and 
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meaninge’ of the ‘texte’ that motive declares itself.”
132
  Hill’s parenthetical and guarded 
acknowledgement of motive and self-interest—“(I have made / an elegy for myself it / is 
true)”—darkly confirms what we might surmise from the poem’s epigraph and a little 
biography; for the anonymous epigraph announces the victim’s birth on June 19, 1932, a 
day after Hill’s own.  The syntax opens a multivocal texture that inculpates the poet into 
the poem’s appropriation of historical violence.  “I have made / an elegy for myself” 
acknowledges the apprehension of the poet’s own mortality.  However, rather than enable 
the irresponsible and melancholic association of the self and the not-self of the epigraph, 
“the process, ordre and meaninge” of Hill’s text asserts the voluminous space which that 
single day represents. Hill’s line acknowledges the subjective validity of the elegy. 
“September Song” is also an elegy only true “for myself.”  And there is, finally, the blank 
assertion of acting within a tradition: “I have made / an elegy.”  Hill’s attention to the 
minute particulars of punctuation and the ways in which they might tune in or tune out 
quotidian motives and meaning enacts the uniqueness of the life represented by that 
anonymous epigraph.  In the encounter with the dead, Hill recognizes the historical 
indebtedness of his act.  The layers of ambiguity in this parenthetical aside recognize the 
common fact of humane encounter with the dead.  In the poetic tradition, we write elegies.  
Insofar as their purpose is consolation for the living, the elegy is for us.  Further, because 
it is an attempt to transmute the phenomenon of death into value, it is only true for us.   
However, as Christopher Ricks points out, “the dignified force of Hill’s poetry on 
such atrocity is a matter of his grasping that the atrocity both is and is not unique, and 
that it presents to the imagination a challenge which likewise both is and is not 
                                                 
132
 Geoffrey Hill, Style and Faith (New York: Counterpoint, 2003), 22-23.  
 
97 
unique.”
133
  Thus even as Hill’s poetic practice insists upon particularity, his idiom and 
images suggest commonality.  The anonymity of the epigraph; the terrific vagueness of 
“things marched, / sufficient, to that end”; the abstractness of “as estimated,” “patented 
terror,” and “routine cries” reinforces the commonness of this particular atrocity.  
Similarly, the play between the epigraph and the equivocation in “I have made / an elegy 
for myself it / it true” points towards both the uniqueness of this elegy (one made for the 
self and true for the self only) and the common impulse to elegize as a means of 
consolation and humane contact in the face of atrocity (an elegy made to comfort myself, 
as we all are wont to do).  Hill’s poetic practice continuously asserts the difference and 
distance between the atrocity and the act of utterance as a means to both acknowledge 
“what is owed the dead” and to arrive at “actuated self-knowledge.”  Rather than 
collapsing the elegiac subject into the act of elegy and finding there the substitute of 
consolation, Hill’s final image asserts the distance between the September of the present 
moment and “24.9.42”: 
September fattens on vines.  Roses 
flake from the wall.  The smoke 
of harmless fires drifts to my eyes. 
The innocuousness of those “harmless fires” and the fecundity of nature juxtapose 
the mechanistic depiction of death in the camps.  The natural images glance at the 
traditional consolation of natural cycles of death and rebirth; yet Hill recognizes in 
“fattens” and “flake” the inappropriateness of this mode of consolation.  There is an easy 
similarity between the harvest of autumn and the human harvest of the Holocaust that is 
entirely inappropriate to a responsible commemoration of the historical atrocity.  Part of 
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the strength of Hill’s judgement here is to allow the acknowledgement of that 
inappropriateness.    Throughout, this disjunction has been mimetically represented in the 
broken lineation of the poem.  The sentences stop mid-line or spill onto the next, 
eschewing the sense-making potentiality of the aesthetic line for the more rigorous 
governance of punctuation.  In doing so, Hill’s poetic practice refuses the motive, 
announced in the parenthetical aside, to appropriate atrocity for the present’s consolation.  
This is the enactment of Hill’s authentic retrieval.  He recognizes the possibilities for 
responsible commemoration available in the ritual of the elegy, not by reiterating them, 
but by acknowledging the elegy’s unfittedness to this event.  Therefore, it is not until the 
final line that we get an atonement of sense and poetic line, and even here it comes in an 
acknowledgement of reticence: “This is plenty.  This is more that enough.”  The 
compounding sense of the line—if the first sentence is “plenty,” then the second must be 
“more than enough”— returns our attention to grammar as the “public and social 
institution” by which we atone for the “tongue’s atrocities.”  Throughout the poem, Hill’s 
“language appears sharply conscious of both its own workings and of the general drift of 
assumption.”
134
  Hill uses grammar, in its position as public institution, to recall “the 
general drift of assumption” back to an attention on the poet’s role as “fabbro.”  The 
scrupulosity of language in “September Song” depicts well Adrian Nichols’s assertion of 
“the difficulty at times—and times more frequent than facile judgement would allow—of 
disentangling the gracious from the disgraceful, of separating out transfiguration from 
disfiguration.  Such is the complexity of historical and personal agency… that judgement 
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must frequently be nuanced and complex.”
135
   
It is through his negotiation of history, personal agency, and the drift of 
circumstance, that Hill achieves an authentic retrieval of the ritual of the elegy as a public 
institution.  Paradoxically, this comes in the form of his recognizing the inappropriateness 
of that institution to transmute the Holocaust into value.  In the face of such atrocity, the 
poet is returned to the condition of “Citations I”: “as broken as the vows and tatters, / 
petitions with blood on them, the charred prayers, / spiralling godwards on intense 
thermals.”
136
  The institutions that we have inherited from the dead cannot suffice to 
transmute historical atrocity into value because the ideologies that ground those 
institutions are often complicit in the atrocity.  The modes of supplication that Hill notes 
in “Citations I” (“vows,” “petitions,” “prayers”) all have their place in the elegiac mode 
through which we have traditionally enacted our being-towards-the-dead.  Yet here they 
are all sullied by the historical atrocities in which they are implicated.  Frequently, an 
authentic retrieval of inherited legacies will consist in recognizing those legacies’ 
unfittedness.  Only in that fashion can we appropriately acknowledge the commonality of 
the event as well as its uniqueness.  We have cultural modes of transmuting loss into 
value—of which the elegy is the primary poetic mode—, and yet, it is through a 
recognition that those inherited modes are incapable of transmitting certain events into 
value that we responsibly commemorate the event.  The incapacity of the elegy is not a 
failure of the genre; it is an acknowledgement that, as Hill acknowledges in “Citations 
II,” “invention reinvents itself / every so often in the line of death.”
137
  In the case of 
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“September Song,” reinvention comes in the form of recognition of the elegy’s 
limitations.  The extent to which the Holocaust exceeds those limitations is an 
acknowledgement of its uniqueness, even as the impulse to elegize, which Hill 
responsibly acknowledges, is a measure of human indebtedness.  At the primal scene of 
historical atrocity, Hill “goes over what has many times been said and done” in order to 
ascertain “what must presently be said and done.”  In considering the dead, Hill retrieves 
the possibilities of his humane inheritance by recognizing his indebtedness to tradition.  
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CONCLUSION 
John Milton, in “An Apology to Animadversions” (1642), notes that his political 
and poetic vocation stemmed from an appreciation of the judgement of classical authors: 
Having observed them to account it the chief glory of their wit in that they 
were ablest to judge, to praise, and by that could esteem themselves 
worthiest to love those high perfections which under one or other name 
they took to celebrate, I thought myself by every instinct and presage of 
nature, which is not wont to be false, that what imboldened them to this 
task might with such diligence as they used imbolden me, and that what 
judgement, wit, or elegance was my share would herein best appear, and 
best value itself, by how much more wisely, and with more love of virtue I 
should choose (let rude ears be absent!) the object of not unlike praises.
138
 
We have seen a similar response to the example of tradition in Hill’s poetic practice.  
What Hill’s and Milton’s valuation of tradition recalls is the novelty of the past.  As 
modernity searches for the new, the utmost bound, and the furthest extension, Hill 
reminds us that, if considered responsibly, the past is another space of exploration and 
limitlessness.  This is the value of literature and reading.  The texts of tradition and 
history embody the worlds which they depict.  They are the spaces of exploration into 
which Hill’s poetry and criticism delves.  We have seen “September Song” search, in the 
historical physicality of the Holocaust, for a responsible commemoration of that atrocity.  
In “Caveats Enough in Their Own Walks,” Hill illustrates how Donne’s verse epistles 
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embody his rehearsal of tradition and how they find there the wisdom with which to 
engage present circumstance.  Similarly, in “The Absolute Reasonableness of Robert 
Southwell,” Hill examines how Southwell’s rhetoric restrains personal animosity in the 
service of Christian justice.  In “To the (Supposed) Patron” and “History as Poetry,” Hill 
enacts a poetic practice that challenges the reader to appreciate the poet’s negotium of 
language.  Insofar as these become more than historical and poetic curiosities for the 
reader, they are the means through which the reader can reconnect with tradition. 
As Harrison shows, this is an increasingly important connection in the age of the 
“new barbarism.”  If, as Hill and Harrison both assert in different ways, a vital connection 
with the past is an essential condition of our humanity, then the disconnection with 
tradition and history that modernity promises (and has largely achieved) is only an otiose 
freedom.  Without a sense of one’s historical indebtedness and the obligations which that 
indebtedness entails, modernity exists in a condition of “freedom from” without any 
guidance as to its “freedom to.”  Without the sorts of connections which Hill’s poetry 
creates, we cannot discern what “must presently be said and done” because we do not 
know what “has many times be said and done.” 
However, Hill’s poems of historical atrocity remind us that in maintaining a 
connection with the past we incur an obligation to atone for humanity’s atrocities.  Part of 
that atonement is effected by our pragmatic rehearsal of history in the present.  Perhaps 
all that we can effect is that atonement in which, by considering the past, we avoid 
reiterative atrocities.  This is the most basic of civic obligations. More positively, history 
and tradition constitute resources for the present which may be generously drawn upon.  
They offer possibilities that can be actualized in the future and thus show humanity a way 
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forward.  This is also part of that most basic civic obligation.  Yet to understand Hill in 
this fashion is to locate him in a tradition that understood literature and knowledge as an 
essential part of a healthy public sphere.  Aristotle argues that a plurality of perspectives 
is more beneficial than a single perspective. Milton repeatedly argues in the pamphlets 
for the importance of an educated body politic.  Although Wordsworth argues against 
books in “The Tables Turned,” the general tenor of his poetry and correspondence 
evinces a strong valuation of literature and history.  Emerson, in his essay “History,” goes 
so far as to understand the rehearsal of history as the primary condition of autonomous 
self-hood: 
Every mind must know the whole lesson for itself—must go over the whole 
ground.  What it does not see, what it does not live, it will not know.  What the 
former age has epitomized into a formula or rule for manipular convenience, it 
will lose all the good of verifying for itself, by means of the wall of that rule.  
Somewhere, sometime, it will demand and find compensation for that loss by 
doing the work itself.
139
 
Hill’s particular contribution to this tradition is his insistence upon embodying that 
valuation in the enactment of verse.  Hill understands his civic obligation to be 
reconnecting the present with its historical indebtedness.  Hill’s poetry considers history 
and tradition, returning the reader to the “bloody facts of history.”  It reminds us that we 
are not self-generated and that, because of our historical contingency, we owe a debt to 
the past, which is to perpetuate its vital presence in the world. 
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Because of his emphasis on enactment, Hill’s practice has political and religious 
implications as well.  In the political sphere, the embodiment of our historical obligations 
in action creates a historical commonwealth, in the full, literal sense of that phrase.  
History and tradition are the common wealth, the shared resource, of the public sphere.  
As such they have the potential to unite a body politic in consideration of historically 
shared concerns.  The enactment of specific historical concerns in utterance (whether 
poetry, prose, pamphlet, or speech) places an individual’s understanding of that 
historicity into the public sphere were it might encounter alternative understandings.  
This is Harrison’s “authentic repetition” on the socio-political level: the individual brings 
his personal considerations of tradition into the public sphere where the full inheritance 
of tradition can be brought into the service of the public good.  Our principal concern in 
this essay has been to show that Hill understands such enactment in the public sphere as 
the poet’s negotium.  Yet this study does not inquire into the specific socio-political 
principles that Hill’s verse enacts.  The result of that study would contribute to a fuller 
understanding of Hill’s relationship with tradition.  In religious terms, Hill’s emphasis on 
enacted virtue reiterates the Jesuit motto: ad majoriam dei gloriam [to the greater glory of 
god].  Yet it remained beyond the scope of this study to consider Hill’s theological 
principles in depth.  However, further pursuit of the allusion to the Sermon on the Mount 
in “To the (Supposed) Patron” might begin provide insight into the specific character of 
Hill’s faith. 
Yet it is ultimately with speculation that Hill seems intent to leave his readers.  
Though his poems are not indeterminate, their formal difficulty resists loose paraphrase 
or easy synopsis.  The value of poetry, of history, and of tradition is that they cause us to 
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reconsider ourselves in the present moment from the perspective of the historical other.  
In considering the value of historical indebtedness, Hill’s poetry forces the reader to 
access the inheritance of tradition and assume his historical obligation. 
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